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THE FEDERAL COURTS’ RULEMAKING BUFFER

JORDAN M. SINGER*
ABSTRACT
Procedural rulemaking is often thought of as a second-order task
for the federal court system, relevant to the courts’ work but not
essential to their function. In reality, rulemaking plays an integral
role in the court system’s operation by actively insulating the courts
from environmental pressure. This Article explains how power over
procedural rulemaking protects the federal courts from environmental uncertainty and describes the court system’s efforts to
maintain the effectiveness of the rulemaking buffer in response to
historical and contemporary challenges.
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INTRODUCTION
For a coequal branch of the most powerful government on the
planet, the United States courts operate under a remarkable
amount of environmental uncertainty. Almost every critical resource
that the courts need to function must be obtained from somewhere
else. The courts look to Congress for funding, judgeships, staffing,
and jurisdiction; the executive branch for judicial nominations,
budgeting input, courthouse security, and enforcement of decrees;
the bar for a steady stream of justiciable cases and controversies;
the media for dissemination of important messages; and the public
for legitimacy. The federal courts depend on these providers to furnish resources not only in adequate amounts but also at predictable
rates: the system cannot operate effectively, for example, if the
number of incoming cases far exceeds the capacity of its courtrooms
or judges.
The court system has a variety of methods for managing this
resource dependency. Some strategies are outwardly focused, designed to extract additional support from external resource providers.1 Other strategies are inwardly focused, designed to restructure
the court system from within to help it manage its existing resources more effectively.2 This Article focuses on one such internal
strategy, known as buffering, and one particularly potent form of
buffering—the crafting of procedural rules pursuant to the Rules
Enabling Act.3

1. See, e.g., Tara Leigh Grove, The Article II Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 112
COLUM . L. REV. 250, 264-66 (2012) (noting the relationship between the federal courts and the
Department of Justice, and the incentives it creates to protect the courts); Harvey Rishikof
& Barbara A. Perry, “Separateness but Interdependence, Autonomy but Reciprocity”: A First
Look at Federal Judges’ Appearances Before Legislative Committees, 46 MERCER L. REV. 667,
674-82 (1995) (discussing direct requests to Congress for additional funding); Dick A.
Semerdjian, Lawyers and Judges: Excellence in the Pursuit of Justice, 42 BRIEF 4, 5 (2013)
(noting judicial activities with the American Bar Association).
2. See, e.g., Orna Rabinovich-Einy & Yair Sagy, Courts as Organizations: The Drive for
Efficiency and the Regulation of Class Action Settlements, 4 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG . 1, 16-17
(2016) (describing a few of the courts’ internal mechanisms).
3. Rules Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012)).
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A buffer is a structure or process that is placed between an organization’s technical core and its external environment to protect the
core from disruption.4 Buffers absorb external shocks (such as
changes in the flow of resources or demand for the organization’s
services) so that the organization’s core operations can proceed
under relatively stable and predictable conditions.5 A single organization can use several buffers in combination,6 and indeed, the process of creating rules of procedure—what I shall call court-centered
rulemaking—is but one of many internal buffers developed by the
federal court system over the past century.
Court-centered rulemaking’s contribution to the federal court
system’s network of buffers stems from its ability to regulate, in
part, the flow of cases into and out of the system. The design of procedural rules can encourage or discourage case filing, make it
easier or harder to end a case before trial, authorize greater or
lesser expenditure of judicial time and resources, and invest district
judges with more or less discretion to manage their individual
dockets. Procedural rules, in other words, act as safety valves for the
court system, allowing it to absorb an unexpected surge in filings or
an unexpected drop in staffing or material resources. The power to
make procedural rules lowers the stakes of resource dependence,
increasing the court system’s overall autonomy and leaving it less
susceptible to environmental disturbance.
Viewing court-centered rulemaking as a strategic buffer sheds
light on two otherwise puzzling facts about the rulemaking process.
First, it helps explain why an efficiency-driven, counter-majoritarian, adjudication-centered entity such as the federal court system chooses to engage in a time-consuming, quasi-democratic, and
policy-driven activity such as procedural rulemaking. The disconnect between the demands of rulemaking and the traditional expertise of the court system could not be more evident: rulemaking is
deliberately slow, forward-looking, and substantively flexible, while
traditional adjudication prizes efficiency, adherence to historical

4. See W. RICHARD SCOTT & GERALD F. DAVIS, ORGANIZATIONS
RATIONAL, NATURAL, AND OPEN SYSTEM PERSPECTIVES 128 (2007).
5. See id.
6. See id.

AND

ORGANIZING :
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facts, and substantive consistency.7 Yet the rulemaking buffer has
proven to be so strategically important to the court system as an
organization that it is willing to sublimate some of its core traditions and practices to maintain control over the rulemaking
process.8
The buffering perspective also helps explain why the court system
has allowed (and even encouraged) court-centered rulemaking to
become progressively complex and hierarchical over time. Nearly all
organizations prefer to operate their buffers privately and under
strong internal supervision in order to maximize efficiency and minimize external interference.9 But organizations with a strong public
character, such as the federal court system, must also be sufficiently
transparent about their procedures to preserve their legitimacy with
the public.10 To view rulemaking as a buffer is to witness fully the
tension between openness and control that pervades the federal
court system’s internal operations. The evolution of court-centered
rulemaking, from the private deliberations of an elite group of
lawyers in the 1930s to the far more complex and open process we
see today, reflects the federal court system’s ongoing effort to find
the right balance.11
More broadly, the buffering perspective sees the federal court
system—not individual rulemakers, judges, or lobbyists—as the
chief protagonist in the rulemaking process. To date, this view has
been largely neglected. Committee- or judge-level analyses of
7. See WOLF HEYDEBRAND & CARROLL SERON , RATIONALIZING JUSTICE: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 97 (1990).
8. Contemporary scholarship increasingly recognizes the organizational character of
court systems and their behavior. See, e.g., Rabinovich-Einy & Sagy, supra note 2, at 12
(“Courts are organizations.... similar to the U.S. Steel Corp., the Red Cross, a corner grocery
store, and the New York State Highway Department.”); Yair Sagy, A New Look at Public Law
Adjudication: A Critical Organizational Analysis and an Israeli Test Case, 24 J. TRANSNAT’L
L. & POL’Y 65, 66 (2014) (“[O]ne does not have to be well versed in organizational studies to
observe that courts possess dominant features of commonplace organizations.”); Ido Shahar,
A Tale of Two Courts: How Organizational Ethnography Can Shed New Light on Legal
Pluralism, 36 PoLAR 118, 118 (2013) (“Courts of law are organizations.”); see also Olga
Frishman, Should Courts Fear Transnational Engagement?, 49 VAND . J. TRANSNAT’L L. 59,
60-61 (2016) (arguing that courts’ use of foreign law can be understood by viewing courts as
organizations within a transnational organizational field).
9. See HOWARD E. ALDRICH , ORGANIZATIONS AND ENVIRONMENTS 22 (1979); cf. SCOTT &
DAVIS, supra note 4, at 128.
10. See infra note 199 and accompanying text.
11. See infra Part III.

2244

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:2239

rulemaking are surely important and add much to our understanding of group dynamics and rule interpretation. But only the organizational view can meaningfully situate the rulemaking process
within the federal court system’s broader ambitions.
In light of these benefits, this Article examines the extent of
court-centered rulemaking’s buffering power, and analyzes the tactics that the federal court system has used to develop and strengthen that power, with a particular focus on the civil rulemaking
process. Part I describes the organizational nature of the federal
court system, identifies the pressures posed by the court system’s
external environment, and introduces more fully the concept of
court-centered rulemaking as an organizational buffer. Part II
situates the federal court system’s campaign to obtain rulemaking
authority in the 1920s and 1930s within a larger strategy to manage its resource dependence and increase its organizational autonomy. Part III explains how environmental pressure since the
passage of the Rules Enabling Act caused the court system to gradually convert court-centered rulemaking from a simply configured,
internal process in the 1940s to one that is structurally complex,
hierarchical, and public today. Part IV looks to current environmental conditions that might pressure the federal court system to
alter its formal rulemaking structure yet again, and examines how
the court system is likely to respond.
I. THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF RULEMAKING
Court-centered rulemaking generally, and federal civil rulemaking in particular, can be understood as an organizational coping
strategy.12 The federal court system relies on external actors for key
resources, among them funding, staffing, jurisdictional authority,
public legitimacy, and disputes requiring resolution. These resources are not guaranteed, and their availability can fluctuate.13 A
12. See infra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
13. This is not to say that the federal courts are not well-resourced. On the whole, federal
judges enjoy higher salaries, more staffing, grander courthouses, and lighter dockets than
their state counterparts. See Gil Seinfeld, The Federal Courts as a Franchise: Rethinking the
Justifications for Federal Question Jurisdiction, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 95, 148 (2009). But these
advantages do not make the court system any less resource-dependent. It still relies on
external providers for nearly all of its inputs.
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drop in funding, a surge in federal filings, or a spate of unfilled
judicial vacancies can strain federal dockets, compromising efficiency and even threatening the basic administration of justice.
The court system cannot directly control much of this resource
variability, but it can try to manage its ebbs and flows. Rulemaking
is one of these management tools. By controlling the development
of procedural rules, the federal court system can implement downstream measures to control its docket—for example, by loosening or
tightening requirements for dismissal; by increasing judicial discretion in areas such as joinder, consolidation, or discovery; or
through the use of alternative dispute resolution.14 This Part explores the federal court system’s resource dependence in an organizational context, looking first at the characteristics that define the
federal courts as an organization, and then at the individuals and
entities outside the federal court system that influence its behavior.
A. The Court System’s Technical Core
Howard Aldrich has proposed a general definition of organizations as “goal-directed, boundary-maintaining, activity systems.”15
Organizations are goal-directed in that their members believe they
are engaged in a common goal or task, as opposed to merely interacting socially.16 They are boundary-maintaining in that they
distinguish between members and nonmembers: some people may
participate in the activities of the organization, and some are excluded.17 And they are activity systems in that the roles of organizational members, and the relationships between those roles, are
structured by the organization’s activities.18
The federal court system embodies each of these characteristics.
Broadly speaking, its goal is to provide a fair and efficient forum for
14. See, e.g., Edward Brunet, The Triumph of Efficiency and Discretion Over Competing
Complex Litigation Policies, 10 REV . LITIG. 273, 291, 303 (1991); Rabinovich-Einy & Sagy,
supra note 2, at 8.
15. ALDRICH , supra note 9, at 4 (emphasis omitted); see also Joel A. C. Baum & Tim J.
Rowley, Introduction to THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO ORGANIZATIONS 1, 3 (Joel A. C. Baum
ed., 2005) (describing the Aldrich definition as an effort “to combine elements” of various
approaches).
16. See ALDRICH , supra note 9, at 4.
17. See id. at 4-5.
18. See id. at 5.
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the resolution of disputes commensurate with its constitutional and
statutory obligations. Its primary activity for achieving this
goal—what we might call the court system’s technology19—is
processing cases to resolution.20 And its boundaries are defined by
behaviors that specifically relate to that technology. Attorneys, for
example, act within the court system’s boundaries when they present disputes for adjudication according to court rules and customs,
and they act outside those boundaries when they seek to resolve
conflicts through private arbitration or settlement. Similarly, jurors and witnesses act within the court system’s boundaries by
participating in trials and hearings at the court’s direction, but act
outside those boundaries once they leave the courthouse. For the
federal court system, as for all organizations, “it is behaviors that
are organized, not individual people.”21
At the heart of the court system’s technology lies an even narrower and more fundamental aspect of its work: the resolution,
through adjudication, of substantial disputes invoking federal law
or federal interests.22 It is this technical core which defines the
19. An organization’s technology is the component of its work that transforms inputs into
outputs. See SCOTT & DAVIS, supra note 4, at 21-22. In the organizational literature,
“technology” is a term of art that includes not just machinery and equipment, “but also the
skills and knowledge of workers, and even the characteristics of the objects on which work is
performed.” Id. at 125; see also JAMES D. THOMPSON , ORGANIZATIONS IN ACTION : SOCIAL
SCIENCE BASES OF ADMINISTRATIVE THEORY 15 (1967) (referring to an organization’s
technology as “an important variable in understanding the actions of complex organizations”).
20. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, A REALISTIC THEORY OF LAW 143 (2017) (“Courts are
organizations that process cases. That is their primary purpose.”); John A. Martin & Nancy
C. Maron, Courts, Delay, and Interorganizational Networks: Managing an Essential Tension,
15 JUST. SYS. J. 268, 275 (1991) (asserting that the job of the court system generally “is to
convert legal disputes, the demands or ‘inputs’ of the environment into disposition, that is to
create ‘outputs’”).
21. JEFFREY PFEFFER & GERALD R. SALANCIK, THE EXTERNAL CONTROL OF ORGANIZATIONS:
A RESOURCE DEPENDENCE PERSPECTIVE 30 (1978). Behaviors associated with the court
system’s goals, and by extension organizational membership, are often indicated by formal
documentation or ceremony (such as a jury summons, the granting of an application to
practice law in the court, or the swearing in of a witness). Such ceremonial trappings help
delineate the behaviors of member-participants from those who are present merely as
observers.
22. The federal court system itself has made clear its own belief that its central role is to
provide a federal forum for the resolution of federal interests. In its 1995 self-study, the
Judicial Conference of the United States asserted that federal jurisdiction should extend to
civil matters in only six narrowly defined areas: (1) those arising under the U.S. Constitution;
(2) those deserving a federal forum because the issues raised pose a strong need for uniformity
or invoke paramount federal interests; (3) those involving foreign relations of the United
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federal courts and makes them distinctive.23 It is also the segment
of court work that is the least amenable to disruption and the first
to obtain the organization’s protection.24 Put differently, while diversity cases will receive the same careful attention as federal question
cases as long as adequate resources are available, under environmental pressure the federal court system is apt to divert its resources and energy to adjudicating federal issues first.25
B. The Court System’s External Environment
Like all public (and most private) organizations, the federal court
system cannot operate exclusively on its own. To survive, it must
interact with other entities, organizations, and individuals located
beyond its boundaries.26 This external environment provides the
court system with the materials it needs to undertake its technical
tasks effectively.27 From Congress, the court system obtains annual
and emergency funding, staffing (through confirmation of judicial
nominees), and statutory authorization (for lower courts, judgeships,
States; (4) those involving the federal government, federal officials, or federal agencies as
parties; (5) those involving disputes between or among the states; and (6) those affecting
substantial interstate or international disputes. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S. , LONG
RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 28-29 (1995), [hereinafter LONG RANGE PLAN ],
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/federalcourtslongrangeplan_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9VKB-TFWN].
23. See Alvin B. Rubin, Bureaucratization of the Federal Courts: The Tension Between
Justice and Efficiency, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW . 648, 657 (1980). The organization’s prioritization
of federal issues is evidenced in part by “an impressive body of judicially created doctrines
that limit or renounce federal jurisdiction in favor of state courts,” including the complete
diversity rule, the “well-pleaded complaint rule,” and various abstention doctrines. John A.
Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing
Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1015, 1018-23 (2002). It is also seen in periodic calls
to curb or curtail diversity jurisdiction. See, e.g., LONG RANGE PLAN , supra note 22, at 30
(calling diversity cases “a massive diversion of federal judge power away from their principal
function—adjudicating criminal cases and civil cases based on federal law”).
24. See SCOTT & DAVIS, supra note 4, at 109-10.
25. See THOMPSON , supra note 19, at 78 (“The more its technology and task environment
tend to tear it apart, the more the organization must guard its integrity.”).
26. Put differently, the federal courts operate in an open system, a complex and dynamic
environment populated by a variety of different actors, materials, and norms. The open
system view likens organizations to organisms: they are “adaptive and interdependent
systems, comprised of various interrelated—possibly conflicting[—]subsystems[,] attempting
to meet and influence the dynamic demands of the environment.” Baum & Rowley, supra note
15, at 6.
27. See id. at 8 (discussing technical environments for organizations).
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and jurisdiction to hear disputes).28 From the executive branch, it
secures judicial nominations, building administration and security,
a steady stream of criminal and regulatory filings, coordination with
law enforcement and regulatory agencies, and the enforcement of
judicial decrees.29 From state court systems, it seeks guidance on the
application of state law;30 from the media, it seeks a means of communicating broadly with external audiences.31 It looks to aggrieved
members of the public and their attorneys to provide civil case
filings. And periodically, the federal court system demands the time
and effort of individuals not party to a dispute to respond to subpoenas and requests for jury service.32
The federal court system also depends on the external environment for its legitimacy.33 Though intangible, legitimacy is a critical
resource: it “seems to provide organizations with a ‘reservoir of
support’ that enhances the likelihood of organizational survival and
perpetuates ... individuals’ loyalty to the organization and willingness to accept organizational actions, decisions, and policies.”34 The
Supreme Court itself has acknowledged that its “power lies ... in its
28. See generally Thomas G. Walker & Deborah J. Barrow, Funding the Federal Judiciary:
The Congressional Connection, 69 JUDICATURE 43 (1985) (discussing the relationship between
the courts and Congress).
29. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY
7 (2015), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/federaljudiciary_2015strategic plan.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6FB6-KGGJ].
30. See id. at 5.
31. See Olga Frishman, Court-Audience Relationships in the 21st Century, 86 MISS. L.J.
213, 241-42, 248-49 (2017) (identifying direct media interviews and press releases as two ways
in which the courts rely on the media to communicate their messages).
32. See, e.g., FED . R. CIV. P. 45 advisory committee’s note to 1991 amendment.
33. Legitimacy is, in the words of one thoughtful scholar, “a generalized perception or
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.” Mark C. Suchman,
Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches, 20 ACAD . MGMT. REV. 571, 574
(1995); see also Jean-Philippe Vergne, Toward a New Measure of Organizational Legitimacy:
Method, Validation, and Illustration, 14 ORGANIZATIONAL RES. METHODS 484, 484-85 (2011)
(“Legitimate organizations are those whose existence, values, and behavior appear congruent
with socially accepted norms.”). To say that a court system possesses legitimacy is to say that
one “belie[ves] in the binding nature of [its] decisions, even when one disagrees with them.”
John C. Yoo, In Defense of the Court’s Legitimacy, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 777 (2001).
34. Leigh Plunkett Tost, An Integrative Model of Legitimacy Judgments, 36 ACAD . MGMT.
REV. 686, 686 (2011) (citations omitted) (quoting John Dowling & Jeffrey Pfeffer,
Organizational Legitimacy: Social Values and Organizational Behavior, 18 PAC. SOC. REV. 122
(1975)).
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legitimacy, a product of substance and perception that shows itself
in the people’s acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine what
the Nation’s law means and to declare what it demands.”35 Possessing legitimacy also allows the court system to justify its consumption of material resources that could “presumably ... find alternative
uses elsewhere.”36 From a general organizational perspective, then,
legitimacy is both a strategic resource in its own right37 and a means
of securing and maintaining other resources.38
Variations in the flow of any of these resources can hamper the
federal court system’s basic work and can even threaten its technical core.39 Most obviously, an increase in case filings relative to the
court system’s material resources places pressure on the system’s
ability to process cases efficiently.40 Changes in resource flow can
also affect the quality of the court system’s services by reducing
each judge’s time to consider the issues and circumstances presented by each case, straining collegial relationships between judges, or
eroding the coherence of legal doctrine.41 And a drop in legitimacy
35. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992) (plurality opinion).
36. See PFEFFER & SALANCIK , supra note 21, at 24.
37. See generally Gerardo Patriotta et al., Maintaining Legitimacy: Controversies, Orders
of Worth, and Public Justifications, 48 J. MGMT. STUD . 1804, 1804 (2011) (discussing strategic
approaches to organizational legitimacy).
38. See PFEFFER & SALANCIK , supra note 21, at 193-96.
39. See George A. Zsidisin & Lisa M. Ellram, An Agency Theory Investigation of Supply
Risk Management, 39 J. SUPPLY CHAIN MGMT. 15, 15-16 (2003) (discussing the risk associated
with the cutoff of critical organizational resources). Resource variability probably does not
threaten the federal court system’s actual survival, given that it is a constitutionally
mandated entity. Yet the loss of resources could still be devastating to the overall work and
effectiveness of the court system, especially since its public character restricts the
organizational strategies that are realistically available to it. Cf. SCOTT & DAVIS, supra note
4, at 21 (discussing limited strategies of public schools).
40. See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 22, at 93-100. Beyond the sheer volume of cases,
the complexity of cases (as measured by case weight) can also influence case processing; Wolf
Heydebrand & Carroll Seron, The Crisis of Crisis Management in the Courts, 4 ORG . & ENV’T
77, 82-83 (1990); Patrick E. Longan, Congress, the Courts, and the Long Range Plan, 46 AM .
U. L. REV. 625, 632 (1997) (noting an 86 percent rise in civil rights filings in federal courts in
the half-decade after the enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the
Civil Rights Act of 1991). See U.S. District Courts-Judicial Business 2017, U.S. CTS.,
www.uscourt s .go v/statistics-reports/us-district-courts-judicial-business-2017
[https://perma.cc/LDS7-ETZW] (“Case types that on average are more time consuming for
district judges to resolve receive weight values greater than 1.00, whereas case types that are
less time consuming receive lower weights.”).
41. See Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1114-15 (2011)
(identifying a correlation between burgeoning caseloads and “lightened scrutiny” of appellate
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can create a spiral effect, depriving the court system not only of
public support, but of support from material resource providers as
well.42
Were the external environment wholly predictable and stable,
the court system could adopt standard behaviors to assure itself of
adequate resources year after year.43 But the external environment
is not stable; it is dynamic and uncertain.44 Congress and Presidential administrations turn over, laws change, competitors in the
market for dispute resolution emerge, and public confidence grows
and wanes. Under these conditions, the court system must employ
strategies to assure both that adequate resources will be available
to it and that those resources will be available at the right time and
in the right proportion.
There is no single organizational strategy for coping with the
threat of resource disruption. Rather, organizations may adopt a
range of strategies, from “passivity to increasing active resistance,”
depending on the nature of the pressure being exerted.45 At the most
cases in the Second and Ninth Circuits); John B. Oakley, The Myth of Cost-Free Jurisdictional
Reallocation, 543 ANNALS AM . ACAD . POL. & SOC. SCI. 52, 60-62 (1996).
42. See Tost, supra note 34, at 686.
43. See PFEFFER & SALANCIK , supra note 21, at 47.
44. See SCOTT & DAVIS, supra note 4, at 128.
45. Christine Oliver, Strategic Response to Institutional Processes, 16. ACAD . MGMT. REV.
145, 151-52 & tbl.2 (1991). This spectrum, first articulated by Professor Oliver, was drawn
from the “convergent insights” of two dominant organizational theories of the late twentieth
century: resource dependence theory (RDT) and neoinstitutionalism. See id. at 145-46. RDT
sees resource dependence in terms of relative power: the entity providing resources has power
over the entity receiving them, and accordingly, an organization’s autonomy is inversely
proportional to its dependence on the external environment. See PFEFFER & SALANCIK , supra
note 21, at 52-53; Johannes M. Drees & Pursey P. M. A. R. Heugens, Synthesizing and
Extending Resource Dependence Theory: A Meta-Analysis, 39 J. MGMT. 1666, 1670 (2013); see
also Gerald F. Davis & J. Adam Cobb, Resource Dependence Theory: Past and Future, in 28
RESEARCH IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS: STANFORD’S ORGANIZATION THEORY
RENAISSANCE, 1970-2000, at 21, 24 (Claudia Bird Schoonhoven & Frank Dobbin eds., 2010)
(noting that power and resource dependence “are simply the obverse of each other”).
Accordingly, RDT suggests that an organization facing environmental uncertainty will take
aggressive steps “to manipulate external dependencies or exert influence over the allocation
or source of critical resources.” Oliver, supra note 45, at 148. Proponents of neoinstitutionalism, by contrast, posit that a resource-dependent organization will conform its
behavior to the norms of the environment in order not to draw attention to itself. See generally
Royston Greenwood et al., Introduction to THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL
INSTITUTIONALISM 1, 3-5 (Royston Greenwood et al. eds., 2008). Oliver concluded that both
theories were correct in their observations of organizational behavior but errant in their
predictions that organizational responses were monolithic. See Oliver, supra at 173-75.
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passive end of the spectrum is a strategy of acquiescence, in which
the organization tries to assure the continued flow of resources by
blindly adhering to prevailing social norms, mimicking existing
institutional models, and obeying rules.46 At the other end of the
spectrum are aggressive strategies such as defiance (in which the
organization dismisses or challenges prevailing rules and norms)
and outright manipulation (in which the organization attempts to
co-opt, influence, or control resource providers and their processes).47 And at the midpoint of the spectrum is buffering: the strategy
of shielding the organization’s technical core from the environment’s
disruptive pressures.48 Buffering provides an extra layer of protection for the organization by inserting a process or structure between
its technical core and the external environment to make the flow of
resources into the technical core steadier and more predictable.49
Rather, Oliver observed, an organization’s responses vary according to the environmental
pressures it faces. See id. at 175.
While RDT and neoinstitutionalism alone do not fully capture the dynamic range of
organizational behavior, Oliver’s typology provides a useful framework for understanding the
federal court system’s strategic responses to its environment. And indeed, over the past
quarter century it has become commonplace to use RDT and neoinstitutionalism to explain
a wide range of organizational behaviors. See, e.g., María de la luz Fernández-Alles & Ramón
Valle-Cabrera, Reconciling Institutional Theory with Organizational Theories: How
Neoinstitutionalism Resolves Five Paradoxes, 19 J. ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE MGMT. 503, 50304 (2006); Amy J. Hillman et al., Resource Dependence Theory: A Review, 35 J. MGMT. 1404,
1416-18 (2009); Tina Nabatchi, The Institutionalization of Alternative Dispute Resolution in
the Federal Government, 67 PUB. ADMIN . REV. 646, 648 (2007); Peter D. Sherer & Kyungmook
Lee, Institutional Change in Large Law Firms: A Resource Dependency and Institutional
Perspective, 45 ACAD . MGMT. J. 102, 102 (2002); Pamela S. Tolbert, Institutional Environments
and Resource Dependence: Sources of Administrative Structure in Institutions of Higher
Education, 30 ADMIN . SCI. Q. 1, 1 (1985).
46. See Oliver, supra note 45, at 152.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 151-52, 154-55; see also Monty L. Lynn, Organizational Buffering: Managing
Boundaries and Cores, 26 ORG . STUD . 37, 38 (2005).
49. See Lynn, supra note 48, at 38-39 (calling this process “[i]nput and output smoothing”).
Buffering can take a variety of forms, depending on the needs and capacities of the
organization. See id. In one form, the organization creates new structural elements to absorb
environmental turbulence before it reaches the organization’s core technology. See Kenneth
J. Meier & Laurence J. O’Toole, Jr., Management Theory and Occam’s Razor: How Public
Organizations Buffer the Environment, 39 ADMIN . & SOC’Y 931, 936 (2008). For example, a
school district may create a specialized intake unit for children of migrant farm workers. See
id. In another form of buffering, the organization reprograms its existing elements to handle
environmental shock; for example, priming an accounting office to handle external audits. Id.
While this Article focuses on public sector buffering, there are just as many examples of
buffering activities among private firms. See, e.g., PFEFFER & SALANCIK , supra note 21, at 108
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Because the organization neither capitulates to the external environment nor demands anything of it, buffering is ultimately an
avoidance strategy.50 Buffering (as used in this Article) is also an
internal strategy, carried out exclusively or predominantly within
the organization’s boundaries.51
The federal court system has successfully implemented several
organizational buffers, among them the Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts and the Judicial Conference of the United States, to
stabilize the flow of resources into its technical core.52 Courtcentered rulemaking, however, is a particularly robust and compelling example of buffering in operation. For more than eighty years,
rulemaking has been an effective mechanism for controlling caseflow in an uncertain resource environment. Moreover, it has revealed itself to have more protective dimensions than its progenitors could have imagined.
C. Rulemaking’s Buffering Qualities
The power to develop procedural rules protects the federal court
system’s technical core in several key ways. First, and perhaps most
importantly, rulemaking regulates (albeit indirectly) the flow of
cases and legal claims into the system. As John Rabiej, the former
Chief of the Judicial Conference’s Rules Committee Support Office,
has explained with respect to class actions under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23:

(discussing organizational efforts to control the rules governing demand and supply
exchanges); THOMPSON , supra note 19, at 20-21 (discussing stockpiling of raw materials and
strategies to smooth out customer demand).
50. See Oliver, supra note 45, at 151-52, 154-55.
51. The internal view of buffering adopted here is consistent with the bulk of the
organizational literature, and excludes techniques such as interorganizational linkages or
widespread interactions with the external environment, which are more typically classified
as “bridging” techniques. See SCOTT & DAVIS, supra note 4, at 128-29, 235-43. But see Meier
& O’Toole, Jr., supra note 49, at 933 (“[E]ven the development of interorganizational linkages
can be a means of buffering core organizational activities.”).
52. See, e.g., Lori A. Johnson, Creating Rules of Procedure for Federal Courts:
Administrative Prerogatives or Legislative Policymaking?, 24 JUST. SYS. J. 23, 24-25, 36 (2003);
Longan, supra note 40, at 635.
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Making Rule 23 too efficient raises a counter-intuitive limitation. As a general matter, the courts could never handle all
claims that could possibly be litigated. They are able to cope
with their caseloads only because the vast majority of litigable
claims are never pursued in court. History teaches that when
Rule 23 is amended to make it more efficient, more persons will
participate in class actions. Professor Francis McGovern, who
has provided helpful counsel to the advisory committee on
numerous occasions, characterizes the ironic consequence of
enhancing a litigation procedure as the “freeway effect.” If you
build a better highway, more drivers will be drawn to it, creating
more congestion.53

Carrying forward Professor McGovern’s analogy, rulemaking
power allows the court system to erect situational “speed bumps” to
dissuade users from flooding the system with more cases than it can
handle. Conversely, should the court system decide to invite new
filings or stem a decline in the existing rate of filings,54 courtcentered rulemaking provides an important avenue to pursue that
policy by lowering barriers to entry.
Rulemaking also permits the federal courts to regulate the flow
of claims out of the system. Under the current iteration of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a district court whose caseload is
disproportionate to its resources—because it is flooded with cases,
for example, or because it is experiencing a high level of judicial
vacancies—has at its disposal a wide range of rule-based techniques
to bring its docket into line.55 Among other things, the Rules

53. John K. Rabiej, The Making of Class Action Rule 23—What Were We Thinking?, 24
MISS. C. L. REV. 323, 327-28 (2005) (footnotes omitted).
54. Like a surge in filings, a decline in filings will often stem from circumstances outside
the court system’s immediate control. See, e.g., Joe Palazzolo, Courtroom Surprise: Fewer Tort
Lawsuits, WALL ST. J., July 25, 2017, at A1 (identifying factors such as state restrictions on
litigation, improved safety, and changes in public opinion as contributing to the national
decline in tort filings).
55. See, e.g., Hillel Y. Levin, Iqbal, Twombly, and the Lessons of the Celotex Trilogy, 14
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 143, 148-49 (2010) (discussing the docket control effects of Rules 12(b)
and 56); see also Edson R. Sunderland, Observations on the Illinois Civil Practice Act, 28 ILL.
L. REV. 861, 871 (1934) (noting that the high percentage of “summary judgments” in the
United Kingdom “is the real explanation why less than twenty judges can dispose of all the
litigation in England brought in the higher courts of general jurisdiction”); William H. Wicker,
Trials and New Trials Under the New Federal Rules, 15 TENN . L. REV. 570, 578 (1939) (same).
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explicitly authorize a district court to promote settlement,56 suggest
alternative dispute resolution,57 dismiss a case for a variety of jurisdictional or substantive infirmities,58 or grant summary judgment
in whole or in part.59 This regulatory function specifically protects
the federal court system’s technical core by helping it block out or
dispose of matters that divert energy from the adjudication of meritorious federal issues.
Of course, the mere fact that the Rules permit more flexible judicial disposition of cases before trial does not mean that such
disposition will occur. Commentators have noted the federal judiciary’s complicated relationship with Rule 56 in particular, with
some judges enthusiastically embracing summary judgment as a
tool of efficiency while others view it with great caution.60 The point
is simply that court-centered rulemaking allows the court system to
invest its district judges with powerful tools for docket control. Just
as rules can be shaped to restrict or encourage the flow of cases into
the system, they can also be shaped to restrict or encourage the flow
of cases out of the system.61
A second quality of court-centered rulemaking is that it consolidates support among the organization’s members by forging a closer
partnership between the bench and the bar. The organized bar has
traditionally been a champion of the federal judiciary and an important link to the entities in the court system’s external environment.62 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure strengthen that
relationship by embracing a teamwork-centered model of federal

56. See FED . R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(I).
57. See id.
58. See, e.g., FED . R. CIV. P. 41.
59. See FED . R. CIV. P. 56.
60. See, e.g., William W. Schwarzer, Summary Judgment Under the Federal Rules:
Defining Genuine Issues of Material Fact, 99 F.R.D. 465, 466 (1983).
61. To be sure, the formal rulemaking process is not the federal court system’s only means
to achieve this goal. It can, for example, lobby for or against legislation that would expand its
jurisdiction. See Rabiej, supra note 53, at 388 (discussing the Judicial Conference’s support
of the Multidistrict, Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2001 and opposition to
an early draft of the Class Action Fairness Act). The Supreme Court can also narrow or
broaden the scope of procedural rules in the course of deciding individual cases. See, e.g.,
Richard A. Nagareda, 1938 All over Again? Pretrial as Trial in Complex Litigation, 60 DEPAUL
L. REV. 647, 660-68 (2011).
62. See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
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adjudication.63 This closer relationship, in turn, protects the court’s
technical core by giving the bar a more personal stake in the workings of the litigation process. The relationship is further bolstered
by the fact that the modern rulemaking process relies on the contribution of practitioners in both formal and informal ways.64
Third, court-centered rulemaking insulates judicial decisionmaking from environmental pressure.65 The federal court system
naturally strives to make district court decisionmaking as rational
as possible, in the sense that decisions are consistent, predictable,
and timely.66 But even life-tenured judges are not immune to pressures from the external environment.67 The ongoing judicial vacancy
crisis, for example, has left some district courts far below their
statutorily authorized level of judges.68 The pressure on remaining
judges to process cases without delay creates at least unconscious
incentives to spend less time on each case than they otherwise
might.69 Other changes in externally sourced resources, such as a
drop in congressional funding or an influx of cases from new federal
legislation, create similar pressures. Indeed, some have suggested
that even the threat of a significant change in material resources
can affect the federal courts’ organizational behavior, including
decisionmaking in individual cases.70
Court-centered rulemaking relieves some of this environmental
pressure by establishing standard operating procedures for district
court adjudication and providing district judges with particular
guidance about how, and under what circumstances, cases should
be resolved.71 The current Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for
63. See HEYDEBRAND & SERON , supra note 7, at 85-88.
64. See infra Part III.
65. See generally Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 23.
66. See HEYDEBRAND & SERON , supra note 7, at 96.
67. See Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 23, at 976-77.
68. As of February 14, 2019, approximately 18 percent of authorized federal district court
judgeships nationwide (124 of 677) remained unfilled. See Judicial Vacancies, U.S. CTS.,
https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies [https://perma.cc/8G7NZBRRF].
69. See Oakley, supra note 41, at 61.
70. See Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 23, at 977 (stating that congressional power over
the courts’ jurisdiction and material resources “seems to have turned the [federal] judiciary
into an effective self-regulator,” devising strategies that “minimize[ ] [its] chances of stepping
heedlessly into political thickets”).
71. See SCOTT & DAVIS, supra note 4, at 55; see also Owen M. Fiss, The Bureaucratization
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example, set guidelines for the timing and content of pleadings and
motions,72 the standards for granting dispositive motions,73 and so
on. By directing district judges to an established set of procedures
and by enforcing internal norms that frown on deviation from those
procedures, court-centered rulemaking aims to increase the rationality and consistency of federal adjudication.74
To be fair, rulemaking is hardly perfect in this regard. Even when
the judicial hierarchy provides uniform guidance on the rules to
lower-court judges, the consistent application of rules is vulnerable
to internal disobedience and interjudiciary fractures.75 Not every
district judge will apply rules in the same way or with the same
vigor—a challenge of internal behavior common to all large organizations.76 Still, most of the time, judges act within a zone of discretion envisioned by the rules, suggesting that rulemaking reduces
external pressure in judicial decisionmaking and creates conditions
within the organization’s technical core that more closely permit
the exercise of rationality.
Rulemaking further insulates the technical core by relieving some
of the workload pressure that might otherwise compromise rational
judicial decisionmaking.77 For one thing, it allows the court system
to delegate certain litigation tasks to other organizational members,
thereby freeing up time and resources for judges to focus on core
substantive issues.78 The current Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
for example, place much of the discovery process in the hands of
parties and counsel.79 Similarly, the Federal Rules expect (and local
of the Judiciary, 92 YALE L.J. 1442, 1451-52 (1983) (describing the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure as an effort to control the decisions of lower-court judges).
72. See FED . R. CIV. P. 7-15.
73. See id. 12, 50, 52, 56.
74. See THOMPSON, supra note 19, at 18-19 (“Under norms of rationality, organizations
seek to seal off their core technologies from environmental influences.”)
75. For a discussion of lower federal courts “materially modify[ing]” or flat-out refusing
to follow Supreme Court directives, see Walter F. Murphy, Lower Court Checks on Supreme
Court Power, 53 AM . POL. SCI. REV. 1017, 1018, 1023-25 (1959), see also Ashutosh Bhagwat,
Separate but Equal?: The Supreme Court, the Lower Federal Courts, and the Nature of the
“Judicial Power”, 80 B.U. L. REV. 967, 971-73 (2000), infra Part III.B (identifying examples
of judicial disobedience in the 1950s before judges gained a prominent role in the courtcentered rulemaking apparatus).
76. I am grateful to Yair Sagy for encouraging me to make this point more explicit.
77. Cf. SCOTT & DAVIS, supra note 4, at 55.
78. See infra notes 79-83 and accompanying text; cf. SCOTT & DAVIS, supra note 4, at 55.
79. See generally Jordan M. Singer, Proportionality’s Cultural Foundation, 52 SANTA
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rules often require)80 the parties to propose a pretrial schedule,81
alert the court as to potential procedural infirmities,82 and identify
salient facts for the court’s consideration on summary judgment.83
This delegation of authority to the organization’s downstream workers allows the court system to better absorb external resource
shocks while simultaneously promoting system-wide consistency in
the adjudicative process.84 Organizational control over rulemaking
further allows the court system to adjust these requirements periodically so as to maximize judicial time and resources.85
Fourth, court-centered rulemaking educates the court system
about its work, and allows it to standardize best practices. Because
procedural rules establish protocols for judges and court staff, the
effect of the rules can be monitored and empirically assessed by the
larger organization. Indeed, the federal court system routinely commissions studies on the operation of various rules and case management procedures through its research arm, the Federal Judicial
Center (FJC).86 By tracking how rules are used and interpreted, the
court system as a whole is better positioned to understand how its
rules work in practice, adjust the rules as necessary, and (if needed)
enforce procedural conformity, an important step to maintaining efficiency in a condition of ongoing resource dependence.87 Internal
control over rulemaking also allows the court system to synchronize
the efficient practices and interpretations that originate in specific
CLARA L. REV. 145 (2012) (discussing ramifications of party-controlled discovery).
80. See, e.g., D. COLO . CIV. R. 5.1, 16.3, 56.1, 81.1.
81. See FED . R. CIV. P. 16(b), 26(f).
82. See, e.g., id. 12(b) (motions to dismiss), 37 (sanctionable discovery conduct).
83. See id. 56(a) (requiring a moving party to show that there is no genuine dispute of
material fact), 56(c) (requiring the movant to cite to the record to show the absence of a
material dispute).
84. Cf. SCOTT & DAVIS, supra note 4, at 55.
85. For example, party responsibilities for (and freedom over) pretrial discovery were
increased in 1970, shortly after the court system became saturated with new federal
litigation. See Robert G. Bone, Judging as Judgment: Tying Judicial Education to
Adjudication Theory, 2015 J. DISP. RESOL. 129, 134-35 (noting an influx of federal cases in the
1960s). When too much party control led to an influx of motions on disputed discovery,
however, rulemakers progressively cut back party control in the 1980s and 1990s. See Singer,
supra note 79, at 179-80, 188-89.
86. See Research About the Courts, FED . JUD . CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/research
[https://perma.cc/ZWU8-U4K7].
87. See generally Oliver, supra note 45 (discussing procedural conformity in the contexts
and comparisons of RDT and neoinstitutionalism).
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districts at a national level.88 All of this protects the court system’s
technical core by positioning rulemakers to give better guidance to
district judges, allowing court administrators to tailor external resource requests to the specific needs of the court system, and providing empirical evidence for administrators to support those requests.
Finally, rulemaking allocates professional capital to the court
system’s organizational goals. Rulemaking bodies cannot investigate and act on every proposed rule change.89 Those ideas that are
pursued reflect the larger goals of the organization, be they the
goals of efficiency, docket control, cost-effectiveness, or accuracy.90
Accordingly, rulemaking has the ability to signal the court system’s
priorities to the external environment. And because the modern
rulemaking process is deliberately protracted, if a signaled priority
raises concerns from an external resource provider, the court system
can formulate an appropriate response before too much time has
been invested.91
Moreover, the development of a rulemaking buffer with the
precise qualities described above is no historical accident. As the
next Part explains, court-centered rulemaking originated as a key
component of the federal court system’s larger buffering strategy
between 1910 and 1940. Initially, the court system seized upon
rulemaking’s regulatory benefits: if the courts could make the rules
themselves, they could improve the efficiency of adjudication and
better manage their dockets. As the century progressed, the court
system would discover and embrace rulemaking’s other buffering
qualities as well. As a result, by the early-2000s, court-centered
rulemaking had matured into a highly sophisticated buffer that
advanced the federal court system’s autonomy on multiple fronts.
88. For example, substantial elements of the 2006 amendments to Rule 26(b)(2)(B),
covering the discovery of electronically stored information, paralleled case law developed in
the Southern District of New York. See, e.g., David K. Isom, The Burden of Discovering Inaccessible Electronically Stored Information: Rules 26(b)(2)(B) & 45(d)(1)(D), 3 FED . CTS. L.
REV. 39, 56-58 (2009). This well-developed doctrine would not have been binding on any other
district court absent codification in the Federal Rules. It is also unlikely that Congress would
have paid immediate attention to the issue had it held direct rulemaking authority. For a
related point, see Levin, supra note 55, at 149-53 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s interpretations of Rules 12(b)(6) and 56 originated with docket-conscious lower federal courts).
89. See Edward H. Cooper, Revising Civil Rule 56: Judge Mark R. Kravitz and the Rules
Enabling Act, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 591, 592-93 (2014).
90. See generally Rabinovich-Einy & Sagy, supra note 2.
91. Cf. Cooper, supra note 89, at 593.
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II. DEVELOPING THE BUFFER
In the early twentieth century, the federal court system initiated
a two-part strategy to increase its autonomy and insulate its technical core from environmental uncertainty. First, the court system
made a series of requests to Congress to grant it more resources and
greater autonomy in the use of those resources.92 Through the extraordinary political acumen of Chief Justice William Howard Taft,
the federal courts eventually secured more judges, a lighter
mandatory docket, and the ability to engage in some degree of selfadministration through the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges.93
Second, the federal court system sought to develop advanced internal mechanisms to allow it to better manage its ongoing resource
dependence. Court-centered rulemaking was a core element of this
internal buffering plan.
A. Taft’s Push for Organizational Autonomy
A century ago, the federal courts were backlogged, decentralized,
and under attack. The administration of the court system (such as
it was) was essentially unchanged from 1789: “[E]ach court managed its work for itself without regulation of its methods by any
higher authority.”94 That approach had worked in a time of lighter
caseloads, but the growth of federal law during Reconstruction and
the Progressive Era had strained the courts to the breaking point.
The federal courts’ criminal docket rose by 800 percent in less than
a decade from the mid-1910s to the mid-1920s,95 spurred by

92. See Henry P. Chandler, Some Major Advances in the Federal Judicial System 19221947, 31 F.R.D. 307, 321-26 (1962).
93. See id. at 318-26.
94. Id. at 313; see also Justin Crowe, The Forging of Judicial Autonomy: Political Entrepreneurship and the Reforms of William Howard Taft, 69 J. POL . 73, 77 (2007) (“Despite
recognition as the ‘third branch,’ the pre-1920 [federal] judiciary was neither capable of planning and administering its own programs nor responsible for the regulation of its internal
affairs.”)
95. See JUSTIN CROWE, BUILDING THE JUDICIARY: LAW , COURTS, AND THE POLITICS OF
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 199 (2012); EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE
PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION : ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL
COURTS IN TWENTIETH -CENTURY AMERICA 21 (2000).
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Prohibition,96 the Espionage Act,97 and a variety of statutes federalizing economic crimes.98 The civil docket was also booming,
owing to a massive expansion of federal statutes regulating business,99 as well as disputes stemming from the cancellation of
wartime contracts after 1918.100 Although earlier legislation—most
notably the Evarts Act of 1891101—had alleviated pressure on the
Supreme Court docket,102 no particular mechanism, legislative or
otherwise, was available to provide immediate relief to the lower
courts. As a result, the federal district courts could not keep up with
the flood of new cases.
Compounding the court system’s administrative challenges was
a tumultuous political environment.103 The unpopularity of the
Supreme Court’s Lochner Era decisions, coupled with the bully
pulpit tactics of Teddy Roosevelt, Robert LaFolette, William
Jennings Bryan, and other Progressive politicians, nourished an
ultra-reform movement that threatened the court system’s ongoing
vitality.104 As Professor Barry Friedman has documented, during
the 1910s and 1920s, Progressive proposals included electing federal
judges, allowing Congress and voters to override judicial decisions,
and prohibiting lower federal judges from overturning laws.105 At
one point, Progressives opposed to the newly created Commerce
Court sought not only to abolish that Court, but also to remove its
five life-tenured federal judges from the bench altogether.106
From the perspective of the federal court system, these conditions can be framed as a series of resource deficiencies. The first
96. See FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT
230 (1928).
97. Pub. L. No. 65-24, 40 Stat. 217 (1917) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 792); see ALPHEUS
THOMAS MASON , WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT: CHIEF JUSTICE 89 (1964).
98. See MASON , supra note 97, at 89.
99. See PETER GRAHAM FISH , THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 19-20
(1973).
100. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 96, at 230; MASON , supra note 97, at 89.
101. Judiciary Act of 1891, 26 Stat. 826.
102. See CROWE, supra note 95, at 175.
103. See Peter G. Fish, William Howard Taft and Charles Evans Hughes: Conservative
Politicians as Chief Judicial Reformers, 1975 SUP. CT. REV. 123, 125-29.
104. See JEFFREY ROSEN, WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT 80 (2018); Barry Friedman, “Things
Forgotten” in the Debate over Judicial Independence, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 737, 747-48 (1998).
105. See Friedman, supra note 104, at 748-49.
106. See Tara Leigh Grove, The Origins (and Fragility) of Judicial Independence, 71 VAND .
L. REV. 465, 482 (2018).
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deficiency was a shortage of material resources needed to overcome
the existing backlog of cases. By 1920, the federal district courts
were seriously undermanned, with widespread congestion and delay.107 At the same time, mandatory federal jurisdiction flooded the
courts with cases that might have been better handled elsewhere,
or not at all.108 The problem extended to the Supreme Court itself;
notwithstanding the partial relief provided by the Evarts Act, the
Court still heard well over 225 cases each year as part of its
obligatory jurisdiction in the decade from 1916 to 1925.109 The majority of these cases were low-stakes and legally unimportant, yet
the influx of filings meant that the average interval between the
filing of a transcript with the Court and a hearing was more than
fourteen months.110
The second resource deficiency was less tangible but more significant: even if the federal courts received more resources to help
process cases, they lacked the legal authorization to organize or
utilize those resources in ways that might improve judicial efficiency. The court system’s finances and administration were under
the control of the Department of Justice, but after years of frustration with trying to wrangle a decentralized federal bench, the
Department had essentially withdrawn from bureaucratic oversight.111 District judges could not be freely assigned to handle cases
outside of their districts,112 and there was no meaningful effort to
keep caseload statistics or identify areas of strength or weakness in
the way cases were handled in each district.113 Even if an enterprising would-be administrator within the court system wanted to
introduce modern bureaucratic methods, he did not have the
authority to do so.
107. See Chandler, supra note 92, at 318-20.
108. See id. at 321.
109. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 96, at 295 tbl.I.
110. MASON, supra note 97, at 108.
111. See CROWE, supra note 95, at 226; FISH, supra note 99, at 98-99; Walker & Barrow,
supra note 28, at 44.
112. Even after liberalizing legislation in 1913, an intercircuit judicial assignment was
considered appropriate only when necessitated by “a judge’s physical or mental deficiencies,
not delays arising from a heavy volume of business.” FISH , supra note 99, at 15-16.
113. The Justice Department kept rudimentary statistics on federal cases starting in the
1870s, but they were crude by modern standards, tracking only pending cases rather than
new filings. See Judith Resnik, Building the Federal Judiciary (Literally and Legally): The
Monuments of Chief Justices Taft, Warren, and Rehnquist, 87 IND . L.J. 823, 844 (2012).
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The third deficiency concerned legitimacy. A quarter-century of
populist attacks on the judiciary, and in particular the Supreme
Court, had taken their toll.114 This was evident in a swath of legislation—both proposed and enacted—that chipped away at the
federal courts’ power and authority.115 The legislative fusillades
were particularly salient because “the elected branches were perceived to be the sole representation of public opinion” and their
attacks “the major informative signal of the Court’s waning public
support.”116 Without direct elections or public opinion polls, the
Supreme Court (and indeed, the entire federal court system) could
not point to any significant, independent source of public support
for its work.117
Collectively, these resource deficiencies significantly restricted
the federal court system’s organizational autonomy. The courts had
no way to control the flow of cases into the system, no way to manage cases in a centralized manner, and insufficient public support
to secure immediate help. To make matters worse, the causes
of—and solutions to—each deficiency lay largely in the hands of a
single entity: Congress. Only Congress had the power to create new
judgeships, limit federal jurisdiction, and allocate funds to the
judiciary.118 Congress alone could authorize the courts to develop
bureaucratic processes and more centralized management.119 And
Congress primarily set the tone as to whether the judiciary’s decisions should be respected or impugned.120
The courts’ dependence on the legislature for so many key
resources posed an obvious problem. Even if the courts could extract
some resources from Congress, obtaining resources adequate to cure
all three deficiencies seemed well-near impossible. How could the
courts obtain more judges when some legislators were trying to
114. See Friedman, supra note 104, at 747-48 (describing prolonged populist attacks on the
Supreme Court during the Lochner Era).
115. See PURCELL, JR., supra note 95, at 22-26 (discussing legislation denying the federal
courts jurisdiction to enjoin state ratemaking as “typical” of the times).
116. Or Bassok, The Supreme Court’s New Source of Legitimacy, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 153,
161-62 (2013).
117. See id. at 162. Meaningful tracking of public support for the Supreme Court and its
decisions did not begin in earnest until the 1960s. See id. at 157.
118. See, e.g., FISH , supra note 99, at 21; Walker & Barrow, supra note 28, at 44.
119. See generally FISH , supra note 99 (discussing Congress’s oversight over and Chief
Justice Taft’s push for reform).
120. See Friedman, supra note 104, at 747-48.
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remove federal judgeships altogether?121 How could the courts secure independent administrative authority when their ability to
perform their most basic function of case processing was openly
questioned? And how could the courts convince Congress of the
need to publicly grant them greater legitimacy when the justice
system was seen as unacceptably slow and expensive? Threading
the needle would require a dynamic, respected, and visionary figure.
The federal courts found that figure in William Howard Taft.
Taft became Chief Justice in 1921, having laid the groundwork
for court reform in a series of passionate speeches over the course
of the previous decade.122 His approach to Congress was to unite
three very different resource requests under a single theme: the
need for “executive principle” in the federal court system.123 If decentralization, docket congestion, and unaccountability were
mutually reinforcing vices in the federal judiciary, then strong,
centralized, internal management could simultaneously improve all
three.124 As Taft explained to the Senate Judiciary Committee in
October 1921, the federal courts required “some head to apply the
judicial force at the strategic points where the arrears have so increased that it needs a mass of judges to get rid of them.”125 Taft
further suggested that with respect to managing caseloads, each
judge “should be subject to a judicial council that makes him a cog
in the machine.”126 And that “machine” required executive management and supervision from within.127
Taft masterfully married the message of executive principle with
tried-and-true political action, leveraging his political connections

121. See Grove, supra note 106, at 482.
122. See CROWE, supra note 95, at 201.
123. MASON , supra note 97, at 97-99 (detailing the “[t]hree needed steps for progress,”
guided under “the executive principle”).
124. See id. at 96-100; Kevin J. Burns, Chief Justice as Chief Executive: Taft’s Judicial
Statesmanship, 43 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 47, 49-50, 55-56 (2018); Robert Post, Judicial Management: The Achievements of Chief Justice William Howard Taft, OAH MAG . HIST., Fall 1998,
at 24, 25-26. This perspective echoed Taft’s faith in centralized executive management during
his presidency. See FISH , supra note 99, at 20.
125. MASON, supra note 97, at 99.
126. Robert Post, Judicial Management and Judicial Disinterest: The Achievements and
Perils of Chief Justice William Howard Taft, 1998, at 50, 55.
127. Id.; see also HENRY F. PRINGLE, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT 995
(1939) (discussing the needed “machinery”).

2264

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:2239

to build alliances for his reform project.128 Taft befriended Warren
Harding’s Attorney General, Harry Daugherty, who would help him
negotiate a hostile Congress.129 Taft also used his close ties to the
American Bar Association (ABA) to secure that organization’s vocal
support for his proposals,130 and cultivated media relationships to
secure support for his proposals and critiques of his opponents.131
Separately, he sought to show Congress that the federal judiciary
itself desired reform. At Taft’s urging, the Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court testified before the House and Senate Judiciary
Committees on several occasions, assuring Congress that the proposed reforms were “a response to real problems rather than judicial
aggrandizement.”132 To underscore the judiciary’s acceptance of its
institutional responsibilities, the Justices were organized into committees to handle internal court business.133
These efforts eventually bore fruit in two major pieces of legislation.134 The Judicial Conference Act of 1922 added twenty-four new
judgeships to the federal courts, authorized the court system to collect performance statistics, and allowed the Chief Justice to transfer
judges across districts as staffing needs arose.135 It also created the
Conference of Senior Circuit Judges,136 composed of the Chief
Justice and the Chief Judge of each of the nine circuit courts of
appeal, which would meet annually to review statistics, discuss internal management, and fashion proposals to Congress as needed.137
The second piece of legislation, the Judiciary Act of 1925,138
converted much of the Supreme Court’s mandatory jurisdiction into
128. See FISH , supra note 99, at 25-26.
129. See id. at 25-34.
130. See Crowe, supra note 94, at 79-80. This would eventually manifest itself in the ABA
volunteering to be a “surrogate for the judiciary” in persuading Congress to provide the courts
with resources. See Charles Gardner Geyh, Paradise Lost, Paradigm Found: Redefining the
Judiciary’s Imperiled Role in Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1228 n.312 (1996) (quoting
Robert A. Katzmann, The Underlying Concerns, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: TOWARD
INSTITUTIONAL COMITY 165 (Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1988)).
131. See Crowe, supra note 94, at 79.
132. Id. at 80.
133. See id. at 78.
134. See CROWE, supra note 95, at 200.
135. Ch. 306, 42 Stat. 837 (1922) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2012)).
136. CROWE, supra note 95, at 200.
137. Id.; see also Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress,
and Federal Power, 78 IND . L.J. 223, 275-77 (2003).
138. Ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936 (1925).
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discretionary jurisdiction, “unburden[ing] the Court from hearing a
multitude of insignificant appeals.”139 With the passage of these
acts, the federal court system acquired both immediate relief from
burgeoning dockets and the ability to manage its long-term caseload
in a more centralized way.140 The court system also increased its organizational autonomy relative to its position even a few years
earlier.141
But the legislation was ultimately a partial solution. Even with
the oversight power available to the new Conference of Senior
Circuit Judges, the court system remained highly susceptible to variations in the flow of external resources.142 To address that problem
more fully, it would need to develop additional buffers to insulate its
technical core.143 One such buffer came in the form of in-house
budgeting, monitoring, and administration, which was eventually
secured by the Administrative Office Act of 1939.144 Another buffer
would be needed to address the flow of cases into and out of the
system, which would take the form of an internal rulemaking
apparatus.145
B. A Special Role for Court-Centered Rulemaking
The capacity to develop procedural rules for civil cases was, in
many ways, an ideal buffer for the federal court system. For one
thing, it had the potential to alleviate all three resource dependencies afflicting the federal courts in the 1920s.146 By creating simplified rules that eliminated procedural technicalities, courts would
be better positioned to steer cases through the system or out of the
system entirely, allowing them to respond more nimbly to surges in
139. CROWE, supra note 95, at 200. For an extensive history of the Judiciary Act of 1925,
see FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 96, at 255-99.
140. See CROWE, supra note 95, at 200; MASON , supra note 97, at 107.
141. See CROWE, supra note 95, at 200.
142. See id. at 226.
143. See Lynn, supra note 48, at 38.
144. Pub. L. No. 76-299, 53 Stat. 1223 (1939) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 444
(2012)). The Act vested the federal judiciary with its own bureaucracy (including budget
authority) and created circuit judicial councils. See CROWE, supra note 95, at 227. Previously,
the federal court system’s budget and personnel management were controlled by the Department of Justice. See Geyh, supra note 130, at 1174.
145. See CROWE, supra note 95, at 213.
146. See supra notes 107-17 and accompanying text.
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case filings or judicial vacancies.147 By placing rulemaking in the
hands of the judiciary, the court system could alter rules more deftly
and with greater precision than could Congress. And by accepting
responsibility for rulemaking and connecting that effort to the
themes of expertise and access to justice, the court system could
bolster public confidence in its overall work.148 In light of this clear
fit with the court system’s larger autonomy goals, it is not surprising that Taft repeatedly advocated for court-centered rulemaking
in his public speeches about court reform.149
But court-centered rulemaking was a much bolder project than
either of the earlier reform initiatives. The 1922 and 1925 Acts each
restructured a portion of the federal court system’s existing operations.150 Court-centered rulemaking, by contrast, called for the
court system to take on a wholly different type of task—one that lay
outside its adjudicative expertise,151 and which had only been attempted on a limited scale before.152 A rulemaking apparatus of the
type Taft imagined would require the federal courts to identify and
assemble a group of competent rulemakers, oversee their work,
monitor the effectiveness of the resulting rules, and adjust rules on
an ongoing basis.153 Court-centered rulemaking also faced a formidable legal hurdle: the Conformity Act of 1872 required each
federal district court in actions at law to follow the “modes of
proceeding” of the state in which it was situated.154 Put another
way, Congress had already spoken on the matter of uniform courtdeveloped rules, and had prescribed the opposite path.
147. See CROWE, supra note 95, at 213-14.
148. See Jack B. Weinstein, The Ghost of Process Past: The Fiftieth Anniversary of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Erie, 54 BROOK . L. REV. 1, 12 (1988).
149. See William Howard Taft, Possible and Needed Reforms in Administration of Justice
in Federal Courts, 8 A.B.A. J. 601, 607 (1922) [hereinafter Taft, Possible and Needed Reforms];
William Howard Taft, The Attacks on the Courts and Legal Procedure, 5 KY. L.J. 3, 13 (1916)
[hereinafter Taft, Attacks on the Courts]; William Howard Taft, Three Needed Steps of
Progress, 8 A.B.A. J. 34, 35 (1922).
150. See CROWE, supra note 95, at 200. Such internal restructuring is a common approach
used by public sector organizations to manage resource dependency. See Heydebrand & Seron,
supra note 40, at 80.
151. Charles W. Grau, Who Rules the Courts? The Issue of Access to the Rulemaking
Process, 62 JUDICATURE 428, 428 (1979) (“Making rules is not the primary function of courts.
According to liberal constitutional theory, their fundamental purpose is adjudication.”).
152. See CROWE, supra note 95, at 215.
153. See id. at 201.
154. PURCELL, JR., supra note 95, at 28.
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A different approach would therefore be needed: one that could
persuade Congress to change its longstanding position on the applicable procedure for cases at law, and simultaneously set up the
court system to succeed in an endeavor outside its core competency.
Once again, Taft was up to the task. Under his guidance, the court
system adopted a three-part strategy. First, members of the judiciary and their allies publicly challenged the long-term sustainability of the Conformity Act.155 Under the Act, some federal district
courts applied modern state procedural codes, others followed old
common law forms of action, and still others disregarded state procedures altogether.156 The result, critics charged, was uncertainty,
expense, and delay.157 Taft seized upon this sentiment to call for a
new, simplified procedural system for all actions at law,158 emphasizing that simplified rules were necessary to reduce cost and delay
in judicial administration.159 Left unspoken was that simplified
procedure would also carry distinct benefits for the court system,
including more centralized control over district court proceedings
and less vulnerability to the whims of individual state legislatures.
The second part of the strategy was to emphasize the specific
benefits of forging the new system of rules through the courts rather
than the legislature.160 In one sense, this proposal could be couched
as a mere incremental step,161 since the Supreme Court already had
the authority to promulgate procedural rules for equity, admiralty,

155. See Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of
the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 692-93 (1998).
156. See id. at 693.
157. See id. at 692-93; see also Comment, Ineffectiveness of the Conformity Act, 36 YALE L.J.
853, 858 (1927).
158. See Taft, Possible and Needed Reforms, supra note 149, at 604.
159. See FISH , supra note 99, at 19. While Taft plainly favored a system that merged law
and equity, and publicly advocated for merger, he also recognized that rulemaking authority
and the resultant uniform rules were conceptually separable. See Stephen B. Burbank, The
Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA . L. REV. 1015, 1070-71 (1982). As Professor Burbank
has described, Taft himself drafted the statutory language that would become Section 2 of the
Rules Enabling Act of 1934, granting the Supreme Court authority to promulgate unified
rules only after such rules had been reported to Congress and Congress had been given a
chance to act. See id. at 1074-75 & n.265. Taft did not appear to believe that a merged system
of rules would be developed until the Court had first devised a set purely for cases at law. See
id. at 1074 n.265.
160. See Taft, Possible and Needed Reforms, supra note 149, at 607.
161. See id. at 604.
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and bankruptcy cases.162 But it still required considerable delicacy.
Any transfer of rulemaking authority from Congress to the courts
could be seen as a significant transfer of power, one that Congress
would be loath to undertake. Taft’s response was not to deny the
potential increase in judicial power, but rather to frame it as being
necessary to serve the interests of efficiency and justice.163 In his
commencement address to the University of Cincinnati Law School
in 1914, he charged that “Congress is content to dump all this business upon the courts and then give no attention to providing the
machinery for its prompt disposition.”164 By contrast, Taft argued,
in England, “[t]he success of the [judicial] system rests on the executive control vested in a council of judges to direct business and
economize judicial force [and] to mould their own rules of procedure.”165 Taft would later cite statistics to support this claim, noting
that of approximately 43,000 civil cases filed in the King’s Bench
division in 1919, more than 28,000 were resolved without any
proceeding after the initial summons.166
The final step of Taft’s strategy was to utilize members on the
court system’s organizational periphery to convey its message to
Congress. Such organizational members, denoted in the literature
as boundary-spanning agents, were able to transition freely between the world of courts and that of the external environment, and
in so doing could finesse the relationship between the court system
and its resource providers.167 The most logical boundary-spanners
for the court system were lawyers, but not all lawyers would qualify.

162. MASON, supra note 97, at 116.
163. See Taft, Possible and Needed Reforms, supra note 149, at 607. To be sure, courtcentered rulemaking would be a boon to court autonomy. In Taft’s view, the transfer of
rulemaking power to the court system would not only ease internal administration, but would
enhance public respect for the judiciary, which had been undermined by decades of political
attacks on judges. See Weinstein, supra note 148, at 12. Gains in public legitimacy, in turn,
would ease the federal courts’ ability to further manage their resources and control their
internal affairs. Taft’s ultimate goal, then, “was not just more judges or a lighter workload but
an improved and empowered judiciary; his focus was not on gaining power in the short term
but on consolidating it for the long-term.” Crowe, supra note 94, at 80.
164. Taft, Attacks on the Courts, supra note 149, at 16.
165. Id. at 13.
166. Taft, Possible and Needed Reforms, supra note 149, at 606.
167. See Mick Marchington et al., The Role of Boundary-Spanning Agents in InterOrganizational Contracting, in FRAGMENTING WORK : BLURRING ORGANIZATIONAL BOUND ARIES AND DISORDERING HIERARCHIES 135, 135-37 (Mick Marchington et al. eds., 2005).
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Those attorneys whose practices did not give them direct and regular contact with the federal court system could not fully appreciate
or advocate for the system’s interests.168 At the same time,
boundary-spanning lawyers did not necessarily have to be federal
litigators. Legal academics, government lawyers, and even legislators might well qualify, depending on the nature and extent of their
interaction with the court system.
With respect to rulemaking, the federal court system found an
early boundary-spanning ally in the ABA. In 1911, attorney Thomas
Shelton introduced a resolution at the ABA’s annual meeting to
create a Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure, which would
seek legislation to empower the Supreme Court to promulgate uniform procedural rules for cases at common law.169 One year later,
Shelton was rewarded with the chairmanship of the Committee.170
He undertook his new role with zeal, speaking and writing almost
immediately on the need for court-centered procedural reform.171
Shelton was also an excellent face for the movement.172 He was intimately familiar with the federal court system but was not defined
by this connection.173 The ability to separate himself from the
courts—to be seen as for the court system without being of
it—would be a considerable asset when it came to negotiating with
Congress.
Shelton was the most prominent boundary-spanning agent during
the campaign for court-centered rulemaking, but he was hardly
168. See id. at 137 (“It is recognized that the work of boundary-spanning agents is complex
and potentially contradictory because they operate at the edge of organizations, often trying
to persuade other people over whom they have not any real authority. On the one hand, this
means that they need to be continually aware of their own organization’s needs, able to move
between a reliance on strict ... requirements, and a willingness to take advantage of deals that
are likely to benefit their own organization. On the other hand, they must be able to empathize with the needs and priorities of those working for collaborating organizations and
appreciate the effect their actions may have on longer-term and wider inter-organizational
relations.”).
169. 35 REPORT OF THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 434-35
(1912).
170. See CROWE, supra note 95, at 214.
171. See Thomas W. Shelton, The Reform of Judicial Procedure, 1 VA. L. REV. 89, 90-91
(1913); see also Thomas W. Shelton, Campaign for Modernizing Procedure, 7 A.B.A. J. 165,
165-66 (1921).
172. See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 948-49 (1987).
173. See id.
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alone. Other nonjudicial members of the federal court system,
among them prominent scholars such as Roscoe Pound and national bar leaders such as Frank Kellogg and Elihu Root, also took on
boundary-spanning roles.174 They sounded the same theme as Taft
and Shelton: court-centered rulemaking was absolutely necessary
if the federal courts were to do their best work.175 These agents also
echoed Taft’s pledge that the work that would go into court-centered
rulemaking would be paid off many times over in public respect for
the courts, procedural flexibility, and outcomes that were faster,
cheaper, and more just.176
Ultimately, the federal court system would also need a boundaryspanning agent who could wield the influence of the executive
branch. Homer Cummings, appointed as Attorney General in 1933,
was ideally suited to take on this role.177 Although firmly planted in
the executive, he had spent the preceding decade in private practice
and had a natural affinity for the judiciary.178 Highly experienced in
both criminal and civil cases, and widely seen as a moderate statesman, he was
a lawyer’s lawyer. He knew the dynamics of both the courtroom
and the office, could relate to both the judge and the client, and
understood both public service and private practice. Of course,
at the same time that he was thoroughly immersed in the
conventions of law, he was intimately familiar with the customs
of politics. A former mayor of Stamford, president of the Mayors
Association of Connecticut, and candidate for a variety of state
174. See Jay S. Goodman, On the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: What Did the Drafters Intend?, 21 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 351, 354 (1987).
175. Pound argued, for example, that one of the “four cardinal items” for improving the
administration of justice was the “simplification of procedure and relegation of procedural
machinery to its legitimate place in the administration of justice”—that is, the courts. Roscoe
Pound, Introduction to THOMAS W. SHELTON , SPIRIT OF THE COURTS at xi, xiv-xvi (1918).
Pound further argued that rulemaking had always been the province of the courts, citing
examples dating back to the Middle Ages. See Roscoe Pound, The Rule-Making Power of the
Courts, 10 J. AM . JUDICATURE SOC’Y 113, 116 (1926); see also Grau, supra note 151, at 428-29
(citing Pound as one of the “proponents [who] long have argued that rulemaking always was
a judicial power”).
176. See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 148, at 12.
177. Cummings was appointed Attorney General only after Franklin Roosevelt’s initial
choice, court rulemaking foe Thomas Walsh, died en route to the capital to accept his
appointment. See CROWE, supra note 95, at 217.
178. Id. at 217-18.
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and federal offices (including both the House and the Senate),
Cummings had carefully cultivated “wide personal acquaintance
in every state” as well as meaningful affiliations with a host of
social clubs, civic organizations, and interest groups along the
Eastern seaboard.179

Cummings exploited his personal networks to great effect. He met
continuously with legislators, with a friendly relentlessness that
eventually broke their resistance.180 He regularly championed the
bill before legal groups, “simultaneously emphasizing that reform
was supported by nearly everyone and that reform would benefit
nearly everyone.”181 He also saw an opportunity to recast the rulemaking movement’s longstanding themes in different political garb.
Notwithstanding the determined efforts of previous boundaryspanners, the rulemaking bill had been stymied by the political
divide between progressives and conservatives182 and had not received any serious consideration since 1926.183 In 1930 the ABA,
reeling from the recent deaths of both Shelton and Taft, chose to
scale back its efforts until the prospects of passage were more
favorable.184 This step back ultimately created “political space” for
Cummings to maneuver.185 He reframed the bill as embracing New
Deal principles, and worked assiduously to secure the support of
President Roosevelt, as well as reluctant Democrats in Congress.186
Sounding the same themes as Shelton, Pound, and Taft, but with a
progressive veneer, Cummings promised that court-centered
179. Id. (quoting William A. Kelly, Honorable Homer Cummings, Attorney General of the
United States—A Biographical Sketch, 14 BULL. NEW HAVEN COUNTY B. ASS’N 13, 15 (1934)).
180. Id. at 221.
181. Id. Crowe further notes that “[t]o illustrate his broad base of political support,
Cummings repeatedly reminded his audiences that reform had been endorsed, at one point
or another, by a distinguished list of prominent individuals, including four presidents (Taft,
Wilson, Coolidge, and Roosevelt); five attorneys general (James McReynolds, Thomas
Gregory, A. Mitchell Palmer, Harlan Fiske Stone, and John Sargent); ‘outstanding jurists’
(and previous judicial reformers) Taft and Pound; the deans of ‘many important law schools
including Harvard, Yale, Cornell, and Virginia’; and, in a 1921 poll, more than 80 percent of
circuit judges and 75 percent of district judges.” Id. at 221-22 (internal citations and footnotes
omitted).
182. See PURCELL, JR., supra note 95, at 31-32.
183. See Burbank, supra note 159, at 1089.
184. See id. at 1094.
185. CROWE, supra note 95, at 223.
186. See id. at 220.
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rulemaking would simplify and improve “‘an outworn system’ that
served ‘to delay justice or entrap the wary.’”187 Conservative Republicans, who had long desired the reform, joined the coalition.188 From
there, events unfolded with startling immediacy. Cummings
announced the Administration’s support for the bill in March
1934;189 within two months the Senate Judiciary Committee favorably reported the bill, and a month later the Rules Enabling Act was
signed into law.190
The Rules Enabling Act’s passage left the federal court system
fundamentally transformed. A judiciary that in 1915 was decentralized, disorganized, and partially delegitimized had become, by
1935, far more autonomous, centralized, and capable of coping
intelligently with its resource dependency. Court-centered rulemaking, along with the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges and the
soon-to-be created Administrative Office, helped to cushion the court
system’s technical core from environmental disruption. But implementing the rulemaking buffer proved to be only a first-order
solution. Court-centered rulemaking itself was now exposed to the
court system’s external environment and would require periodic
maintenance to preserve its efficacy as an organizational shield.
III. MAINTAINING THE BUFFER
The passage of the Rules Enabling Act substantially enhanced
the federal court system’s organizational autonomy. Not only was
the court system authorized to develop a set of rules that could help
it regulate the flow of system-wide inputs and outputs, but those
rules could be adjusted as needed and without external interference.191 The original Rules Enabling Act imposed no particular
requirements on the internal structure of the rulemaking process,
and the Supreme Court took advantage, assigning the entire task

187. See id. at 222 (citation omitted).
188. See id. at 222-23.
189. See Burbank, supra note 159, at 1096.
190. See id. at 1096-97.
191. See Mark R. Kravitz et al., They Were Meant for Each Other: Professor Edward Cooper
and the Rules Enabling Act, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 495, 507 (2013).
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to a single Advisory Committee of experts working directly under
the Court’s aegis.192
Between 1935 and 1937, the Advisory Committee worked in
private to develop a simplified and unified set of rules for federal
civil cases.193 In drafting the rules, the Advisory Committee neither
included nor sought significant input from those outside the court
system, effectively maximizing the court system’s internal control.194
At the same time, the rulemaking process enjoyed a substantial
degree of external legitimacy, owing to a general confidence in expertise that prevailed during the New Deal Era.195 Simply put,
outsiders expressed little desire to second-guess the Advisory Committee’s initial work; the Committee’s credentials, along with legislative authorization and the public’s general support of the courts,
provided all the legitimacy that was needed.
Longtime proponents of courtcentered rulemaking had hoped for
exactly this result, with tight internal control over rulemaking proceeding in lockstep with public confidence and respect.196 To the
extent there was grumbling about the process (mostly from lawyers
unenthusiastic about learning a new set of rules), the court system’s
response was to double down on the technocratic benefits of internal
control. Court-centered rulemaking, it was argued, was legitimate
precisely because recognized experts were in charge. This messaging largely succeeded, and within a generation, the new rules
regime helped consolidate the court system’s relationship with the
bar.
But the conflation of internal control and external legitimacy was
unsustainable.197 In publicly oriented organizations such as the federal court system, control and legitimacy are typically in opposition.
On the one hand, opacity and strong internal control serve the court
192. See id. at 495.
193. See id. at 503-04.
194. See Richard D. Freer, The Continuing Gloom About Federal Judicial Rulemaking, 107
NW . U. L. REV. 447, 460 (2013).
195. See infra Part III.A.
196. See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 148, at 13 (noting Chief Justice Charles Evans
Hughes’s assertion that uniform, court-developed rules of procedure would build and enhance
respect for the judiciary “at the grassroots level”).
197. RDT, for example, would predict that the original form of court-centered rulemaking
could not absorb and benefit from the legitimacy of supportive outside groups because the
cloistered expert model of the original Advisory Committee did not allow for many visible
connections to the external environment. See Drees & Heugens, supra note 45, at 1688.
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system’s organizational interests of “maintaining autonomy, minimizing external intervention, and maximizing efficiency.”198 On the
other hand, as a government entity, the court system must be more
open and transparent about its internal activities than organizations whose work does not rely on public approval.199 It was only a
matter of time before the federal court system would be forced to
confront the tradeoff between control and legitimacy directly.
The challenges began in earnest in the mid-1950s, when an
increase in judicial dissatisfaction with certain rules threatened the
overall stability of the rulemaking process. They arose in a different form in the 1970s, amid a growing sense that “legitimate”
rulemaking required transparency and broader public participation.
And they appeared yet again in the 1990s, when increasing public
involvement in rulemaking threatened to ossify the process altogether.
The court system reacted to the challenges of each era by
initiating a series of strategic responses designed to maintain the
legitimacy of rulemaking among its critical audiences. It addressed
internal dissatisfaction in the 1950s by increasing the role of federal
judges in the rulemaking process. It dealt with calls for transparency in the 1970s and 1980s by opening its rulemaking procedures
to the public and bringing its practices in line with the prevailing
expectations for administrative rulemaking. And, since the 1990s,
it has further opened the rulemaking process to public view and
comment, while quietly decoupling the substance of rulemaking
from its (increasingly complex) formal procedures.
In comparison to the tightly controlled rulemaking of the 1930s,
these developments represented a steady forfeiture of internal control over court-centered rulemaking, as well as a partial erosion of
rulemaking’s effectiveness as a buffer.200 But the strategic responses
198. See Oliver, supra note 45, at 155.
199. See id. (noting that when an organization requires public approval, “the misguided
effort to decouple organizational activities from public inspection and evaluation may throw
the organization’s activities open to suspicion and reduce its ability to obtain resources,
legitimacy, or social support”); see also Drees & Heugens, supra note 45, at 1688 (“In-sourcing
arrangements allow organizations to manage resource dependencies through buffering-type
mechanisms, but they lack the legitimacy bestowing effect of the other arrangement types.”).
200. See Johnson, supra note 52, at 33 (“[Advocates of RDT] hope to insulate the work of
the courts from the vicissitudes of democratic politics and promote less costly and more
uniform disposition of cases.”); Russell R. Wheeler, Broadening Participation in the Courts

2019]

THE FEDERAL COURTS’ RULEMAKING BUFFER

2275

of each era also mitigated that erosive effect by advancing courtcentered rulemaking’s other buffering qualities. Persuading a
generation of attorneys to accept the rulemaking process and its
results in the 1940s enabled the court system to consolidate its
relationship with the bar. Expanding the Advisory Committee and
incorporating the Judicial Conference into the rulemaking process
in the 1950s allowed the court system to better insulate itself from
environmental pressures. Including public input and empirical
research in the 1970s and 1980s fit with rulemaking’s ability to educate the court system about its work. And the need to decouple
actual rule revisions from the growing number of public suggestions in the 1990s and 2000s gave the court system more of an opportunity to set the agenda for procedural policy by selecting the
specific issues that would demand its attention.
The challenges, responses, and revelations of each era are set out
in Table 1 below. It illustrates how the federal court system’s
management of legitimacy threats over time transformed a relatively simple, tightly controlled rulemaking process with primarily
regulatory benefits into something far more open, complex, and
robust.

Through Rule-Making and Administration, 62 JUDICATURE 280, 282 (1979) (“Judicial control
of judicial administration rests largely on the power to make system-wide rules of procedure
and the existence of administrative offices capable of undertaking court management tasks.”).
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Table 1. Responses to Legitimacy Deficiencies in the Rulemaking
Process, 1934-2015
Era

Threat to
legitimacy

Court system response

Elevated quality
of rulemaking

19341956

Novelty

Persuasion: emphasize
rulemaker expertise

Consolidation

19571974

Unworkability

Cooptation: bring judges
into the rulemaking fold

Insulation

19751994

Insularity

19952015

Ossification

Influence tactics: solicit
bar and legislative support
for restructuring
rulemaking process in a
manner that centralizes
judicial control
Isomorphism: align
elements of court-centered
rulemaking with agency
rulemaking, ceding some
authority to protect
legitimacy
Decoupling: cede
autonomy at the margins,
and move the core of
rulemaking away from
full, formal process

Education

Allocation

A. Emphasizing Expertise, 1934-1956
Court-centered rulemaking came into the world with a high degree of legitimacy, but that legitimacy was not quite universal. In
particular, the Rules Enabling Act had been opposed by lawyers
who were skeptical of the need for and propriety of a new system of
procedure.201 The bill eventually passed over their opposition, but
201. Predictably, many older attorneys who had flourished under the old rules were loath
to learn a new system late in their careers. See Richard W. Galiher, The Lawyers Look at the
Rules After Seventeen Years of Use, 1955 A.B.A. SEC . INS . NEGL. & COMPENSATION L. PROC.
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going forward the court system still needed the practicing bar to
lend professional legitimacy to the rulemaking enterprise. Indeed,
the legal profession had the power to extend three different forms
of legitimacy to the rulemaking process, all of which would be essential for the new rules to be effective.202 Attorneys could provide
instrumental legitimacy to the extent they believed that courtcentered rulemaking operated well enough to advance their professional interests.203 They could offer relational legitimacy to the
extent they believed that rulemaking affirmed their self-worth and
social identity and treated them with professional dignity and
respect.204 And they could lend moral legitimacy to the extent they
believed the rulemakers’ practices and behaviors were consistent
with the legal profession’s own moral and ethical values.205
All three forms of legitimacy might have come from directly
involving the bar in the rulemaking process. But despite some initial promises to the contrary,206 the original Advisory Committee did
259, 260 (1955) (recalling “how horrified the older lawyers in the District of Columbia were
when the Federal Rules were adopted”). A related objection was raised by lawyers whose
practice was limited to a particular state and who could depend on the same procedures
applying in state or federal court. Even though the Conformity Act never assured true conformity between state and federal procedures within a state, the result was still more
predictable than an entirely new set of rules would be. As Edson Sunderland noted shortly
after the passage of the Rules Enabling Act, those “lawyers ... whose practice chiefly consists
of state and federal litigations in their own states ... will be more substantially benefitted by
conformity between state and federal practice within the state than by federal uniformity
throughout the nation.” Edson R. Sunderland, Character and Extent of the Rule-Making Power
Granted U.S. Supreme Court and Methods of Effective Exercise, 21 A.B.A. J. 404, 409 (1935);
see also Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2007-08 (1989) (“[M]any
who resisted [reform] maintained that the Conformity Act worked properly and aided local
lawyers.”); Address of Chief Justice Hughes, 21 A.B.A. J. 340, 340 (1935) (“[Many lawyers] do
not wish to be put to the necessity of learning a new system of procedure in actions at law.”).
202. See Tost, supra note 34, at 690-94 (identifying three components as the basis for the
content of legitimacy judgments).
203. See id. at 692.
204. See id. at 690.
205. See id. at 694.
206. See Address of Chief Justice Hughes, supra note 201, at 341 (“[F]ull opportunity should
be given for the cooperation of the Bench and Bar in the different Circuits through the
adequate and helpful expression of their views.”); see also Charles E. Clark, A Striking Feature of the Proposed New Rules, 22 A.B.A. J. 787, 787 (1936) (“[W]e are now prepared for a
quite unique development ... namely, the invitation to the bar as a whole to participate in the
work of drafting both by suggestions in advance and criticism after an initial first draft has
been prepared.”); Charles E. Clark, The Challenge of a New Federal Civil Procedure, 20
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not seek broad attorney participation.207 The Committee circulated
its proposed rules only to selected judges and lawyers before
forwarding them to the Supreme Court,208 and made little effort to
obtain feedback on the proposed rules or justify its work more publicly.209 Instead, the Committee chose to win over the bar by emphasizing its own isolation and expertise.
This was a sensible approach, given the times. The Rules Enabling Act came into being just as the “expertise” theory of government was gaining purchase among the New Deal political elite.210
As one proponent explained, “[a]dministration by non-political technical experts is the contemporary answer to the challenge to bridge
the gap between popular government and scientific government.”211
Judges generally subscribed to this technocratic view,212 as did the
general public213 and many in Congress.214 Indeed, the Rules
Enabling Act itself was passed with the presumption “that those
with the most experience with the federal courts—lawyers, law
professors, and judges—were the ones who should have the
responsibility for writing and reviewing the rules of procedure.”215

CORNELL L.Q. 443, 458 (1935) (citing Chief Justice Hughes’s 1935 speech for the proposition
that “the Court will welcome the aid of the Bench and Bar, of the Department of Justice, and
of all those interested in the improvement of procedure”).
207. At minimum, it seems clear that Charles Clark, whose stamp upon the initial Advisory
Committee is beyond question, held the opinions of practicing lawyers on matters of procedure
in far less regard than those of experts like himself. See Subrin, supra note 172, at 968-69.
208. See Brooke D. Coleman, Recovering Access: Rethinking the Structure of Federal Civil
Rulemaking, 39 N.M. L. REV. 261, 275 (2009).
209. See Freer, supra note 194, at 460; see also Richard L. Marcus, Reform Through
Rulemaking?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 901, 910 (2002) (displaying skepticism regarding the amount
of outside consultation the rulemakers engaged in during their reform efforts).
210. See William J. Butler, The Rising Tide of Expertise, 15 FORDHAM L. REV. 19, 23-24
(1946) (describing the “expertise” theory); see also Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of Deference:
Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence of New Deal Administrative Law, 106 MICH . L. REV. 399,
417-18 (2007) (“[The] theme of expertise permeated the thought of intellectuals within the
administration.”); Laurens Walker, The End of the New Deal and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1269, 1272-74 (1997) (“The New Dealers were committed to
expertise.”).
211. John Dickinson, Judicial Control of Official Discretion, 22 AM . POL. SCI. REV. 275, 277
(1928).
212. See Butler, supra note 210, at 25-27 (citing examples).
213. See Bassok, supra note 116, at 168-70.
214. See Walker, supra note 210, at 1272-73.
215. Johnson, supra note 52, at 35.
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The credentials of the first Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
were perfectly suited to lend this sort of expert legitimacy to the
new rulemaking enterprise. Although the Supreme Court was slow
to create the Committee, by June 1935 it had assembled a group of
fourteen highly respected lawyers and academics, led by former
Attorney General William Mitchell.216 The group included Professor
Armistead Dobie of the University of Virginia, A.B.A. Journal editor and Special Assistant to the Attorney General of the United
States Edgar Tollman, and Florida state senator and ABA President
Scott Laughton, in addition to two particularly influential academics, Charles Clark of Yale (who would serve as Reporter to the
Committee) and Edson Sunderland of the University of Michigan.217
Clark himself argued that the appointment of these original
members “was a practical way of giving concrete expression to
informed professional and scientific opinion as to the course the
reform should take.”218
This emphasis on a professional and scientific approach was wellsuited to a legal community that was completing its own professional transformation. By this time, American law schools had
embraced the “German scientific method” of legal study, which
valued “empirical investigation, verification, and inductive logic.”219
Moreover, the rapid professionalization of both federal judges and
lawyers in the early twentieth century made it possible for attorneys to think of themselves as officers of the court for the first
time.220 As their own professional identities became imbued with a
sense of scientific rigor, lawyers were bound to find unobjectionable
the professed application of similar rigor in court-centered rulemaking.221 The bar’s faith in expertise also bought the court system time
216. Goodman, supra note 174, at 356 & n.30. Mitchell’s February 1935 letter to Chief
Justice Hughes pushing for full implementation of the rulemaking program may well have
contributed to him being named the Chair of the Committee. See Charles E. Clark, Two
Decades of the Federal Civil Rules, 58 COLUM . L. REV. 435, 439 (1958).
217. See Goodman, supra note 174, at 356 & n.30; John J. Parker, Improving the
Administration of Justice, 27 A.B.A. J. 71, 71 (1941).
218. Charles E. Clark, The Proposed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 22 A.B.A. J. 447, 447
(1936).
219. Laura I. Appleman, The Rise of the Modern American Law School: How
Professionalization, German Scholarship, and Legal Reform Shaped Our System of Legal
Education, 39 NEW ENG . L. REV. 251, 253, 279 (2005).
220. See Resnik, supra note 113, at 861.
221. See id. at 863-64.
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to promote the virtues of the new rules more widely.222 By the early
1950s, a full generation of lawyers had been raised exclusively on
the new Federal Rules and was comfortable with the expanded
pretrial role for attorneys that the rules envisioned.223
While outreach to the bar in this era was more explanatory than
participatory, it did underscore rulemaking’s ability to consolidate
the support of the court system’s key organizational members.224 By
appealing to the same values (merit, professionalism, and scientific
expertise) that the bar was using to define itself, the court system
bought goodwill for the first decade of its rulemaking experiment.
And by drafting rules that treated lawyers as full partners in
pretrial litigation, the federal court system was able to obtain support from the bar that would extend beyond the rulemaking process.
B. Looking Inward, 1957-1974
Uncritical faith in the Advisory Committee’s expert credentials
would not last.225 As the twentieth century reached its midpoint,
there was a growing sense within the judiciary itself that “expert”
committees and institutions were entitled to less deference than
previously thought.226 Justice Frankfurter, for example, had been an
enthusiastic advocate for “the deliberateness and truthfulness of
really scientific expertness” leading up to and during the New Deal
Era,227 and had expressed “confidence in the informed judgment of
the Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure” as late as

222. See, e.g., Parker, supra note 217, at 71-72; John J. Parker, The Judicial Office in the
United States, 20 TENN. L. REV. 703, 708-09 (1949).
223. See Galiher, supra note 201, at 260-61.
224. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
225. Although it does not appear to have been directed to court-centered rulemaking
specifically, during the 1950s there was a more full-throated and broad-based public backlash
against expert domination of policymaking and public institutions. See RICHARD HOFSTADTER,
ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM IN AMERICAN LIFE 221, 223-27 (1963) (describing the backlash in the
context of the 1952 Presidential campaign).
226. See Mark Fenster, The Birth of a “Logical System”: Thurman Arnold and the Making
of Modern Administrative Law, 84 OR. L. REV. 69, 132-33, 135-36 (2005).
227. Walker, supra note 210, at 1272 (quoting Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Attorney,
Bureau of Insular Affairs, U.S. War Dep’t, to Learned Hand, U.S. Dist. Judge, S. Dist. of N.Y.
(Sept. 23, 1912), reprinted in JAMES O. FREEDMAN , CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 45 (1978)).
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1946.228 But by the early 1950s, Justice Frankfurter found himself
losing faith in expert discretion.229 External checks on expert
decisionmaking would be—in the words of Frankfurter’s protégé
Louis Jaffe—a “necessary condition, psychologically if not logically,
of a system of administrative power which purports to be legitimate,
or legally valid.”230
The weakened judicial enthusiasm for expert rulemaking was
not just philosophical. In practice, the federal judiciary struggled
to implement the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the manner the Advisory Committee had hoped.231 District courts around the
country proliferated inconsistent or redundant local rules, undermining the promised uniformity of the new Federal Rules regime.232
Judges also criticized or ignored individual rules that they found
too cumbersome—such as Rule 52(a)’s requirement that they specifically state their findings of fact and conclusions of law in a bench
trial233—or too lenient—such as Rule 8(a)’s guidance that a pleading need only contain “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,”234 no matter how
complex the case.235 In 1952, the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference
bluntly adopted a resolution calling for Rule 8 to be amended to
require a pleading to “contain the facts constituting a cause of
action.”236
The absence of a judicial voice on the Advisory Committee must
have hampered its ability to be fully responsive to these concerns.
And in any event, the Advisory Committee as then constituted

228. Order, 329 U.S. 843 (1946).
229. See Fenster, supra note 226, at 132-33.
230. LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 320 (1965).
231. See Subrin, supra note 201, at 2016-17.
232. See id.
233. See, e.g., Note, The Law of Fact: Findings of Fact Under the Federal Rules, 61 HARV.
L. REV. 1434, 1435 (1948). Rule 52(a) engendered “voluble” pushback from the judiciary by the
late 1940s. See id.; see also Clarence M. Hanson, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: An
Outmoded Relic of the Stage Coach Days, 32 A.B.A. J. 52, 54 (1946) (detailing the
impracticalities of Rule 52(a)).
234. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
235. See Rebecca Love Kourlis et al., Reinvigorating Pleadings, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 245,
250-51 (2010).
236. Judicial Conference of the Judges of the Ninth Circuit, Claim or Cause of Action: A
Discussion on the Need for Amendment of Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
13 F.R.D. 253, 253 (1952).
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seemed unwilling or unable to address the complaints in a rigorous
manner. Consequently, by the mid-1950s, the committee dwindled
into irrelevance.237 In October 1955, the Advisory Committee offered
a package of rules amendments to the Supreme Court, but the Court
took no action.238 Instead, it abruptly entered an order on October
1, 1956, terminating the Advisory Committee as a continuing body
and thanking its members for their service.239
Dissolving a committee that had lost the confidence of a substantial part of the judiciary was a responsible act, if not a particularly
courageous one. No organization can maintain rulemaking authority
if its own members lack confidence in the rulemaking process. But
dissolving the committee was only the first step. Without a formal
rules committee in continuous operation, the Supreme Court faced
the choice of letting the existing rules stay in force without regular
review and revision, or taking up the rulemaking task itself.240
Neither seemed acceptable.241
The most straightforward solution would have been for the
Supreme Court to reconstitute the Advisory Committee with new
membership—membership that this time would include a number
of federal judges. Including judges in rulemaking made sense as a
matter of maintaining rule quality (by offering an important
perspective on how the rules worked in practice) as well as sound
237. See Albert B. Maris, Federal Procedural Rule-Making: The Program of the Judicial
Conference, 47 A.B.A. J. 772, 773 (1961).
238. See id.
239. See Order Discharging the Advisory Committee, 352 U.S. 803 (1956).
240. The only other rules committee in existence at the time, the Advisory Committee on
Criminal Rules, had never been empowered as a continuing body. See Maris, supra note 237,
at 773-74.
241. The judiciary’s ability to continually review and revise procedural rules was asserted
to be a primary benefit of court-centered rulemaking as far back as the 1910s. See, e.g.,
Edmund M. Morgan, Judicial Regulation of Court Procedure, 2 MINN. L. REV. 81, 83-85 (1918).
Yet commentators had warned that rulemaking lay beyond the Supreme Court’s direct
competency, see Edson R. Sunderland, Implementing the Rule-Making Power, 25 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 27, 29-32 (1950), and Chief Justice Warren himself concluded in 1957 that “[t]he existing
personnel and facilities of the Supreme Court are in no sense adequate to the great
responsibility for rulemaking.” The Rule-Making Function and the Judicial Conference of the
United States: A Discussion of Rule-Making Under a Plan Soon to Be Considered by the
Congress of the United States, 21 F.R.D. 117, 118 (1957); see also Steven S. Gensler, Ed
Cooper, Rule 56, and Charles E. Clark’s Fountain of Youth, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 593, 601
(2013) (“[T]he Court could have had no intention of doing the necessary research and drafting
work itself.”); Maris, supra note 237, at 774 (“[T]he Supreme Court itself has neither the time
nor the staff to undertake the extensive study and research involved.”).
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organizational management (by providing the organization’s most
important members a voice on matters that directly affected
them).242 Moreover, there was no statutory barrier to reshuffling
the Advisory Committee’s membership in this way: the text of the
Rules Enabling Act remained remarkably deferential to the
Supreme Court’s judgment as to how best to effectuate the rulemaking process.243 Had the Court simply announced that it was
appointing a new committee that would now include several wellrespected judges, it likely would have been greeted with little more
than a supportive shrug.
The court system’s leadership, however, saw the Advisory Committee crisis not only as an opportunity to shore up its internal
legitimacy with federal judges, but also to further insulate the court
system from environmental disruption. In 1957, Chief Justice Earl
Warren, Justice Tom Clark, and Fourth Circuit Judge John Parker
developed a new plan as they crossed the Atlantic aboard the Queen
Mary on their way to the American Bar Association’s meeting in
London.244 The plan called for the Judicial Conference of the United
States to create and supervise a series of committees, each responsible for the review and development of procedural rules in a given
field.245 The Chief Justice, as Chairman of the Judicial Conference,
would appoint the members of each committee.246 The Judicial
Conference would approve all proposed rules before submitting
them to the Supreme Court for review and promulgation.247
The so-called Queen Mary Compromise was an audacious proposal, a disproportionately large solution for a lesser problem.
Involving the Judicial Conference and creating a vast hierarchy of
committees might have improved internal support for courtcentered rulemaking, but the same support likely could have been
achieved simply by adding judges to the Advisory Committee. The
Supreme Court did not want direct rulemaking responsibility, but
that hardly called for such a complex and involved rulemaking
242. See Parker, supra note 217, at 72.
243. See Burbank, supra note 159, at 1097-98, 1101-02.
244. See Thomas E. Baker, An Introduction to Federal Court Rulemaking Procedure, 22
TEX. TECH L. REV. 323, 328 (1991) (discussing the “Queen Mary Compromise”); John P. Frank,
Justice Tom Clark and Judicial Administration, 46 TEX. L. REV. 5, 34 (1967).
245. See Frank, supra note 244, at 34.
246. See Baker, supra note 244, at 328.
247. See Frank, supra note 244, at 34.
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structure. In any event, there had been no groundswell outside the
courts to change the existing rulemaking system.248 Moreover, the
proposed changes would need congressional approval, and Congress
had already considered once before—and rejected—any formal role
for the Judicial Conference in the rulemaking process.249 As an
answer to the otherwise manageable problem of replacing an aging
and unpopular Advisory Committee, the Queen Mary Compromise
made no sense.
As a mechanism for insulating the court system and increasing
its autonomy, however, the Compromise was a brilliant tactical
maneuver. Under the guise of solving a rulemaking problem, the
court system would be able to increase the power and influence of
the Judicial Conference, its primary administrative body.250 The
proposal also brought together the three buffering structures that
the court system had secured during the 1920s and 1930s.251 Courtcentered rulemaking and the Judicial Conference would be inex248. See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
249. Chief Justice Hughes, with the assistance of then-Professor Felix Frankfurter, lobbied
the Senate Judiciary Committee for a Judicial Conference role in rulemaking back in the early
1930s. See FISH , supra note 99, at 62-64. But when the Rules Enabling Act was passed in
1934, it made no provision for the Conference’s involvement. See id.
250. It should come as no surprise that the three men behind the Queen Mary Compromise
would seek to inject the Judicial Conference directly into the rulemaking process. All three
were dedicated proponents of Roscoe Pound’s philosophy of court administration, which
emphasized centralized authority over the judicial system, flexibility for the courts to make
their own procedural rules, and altering both institutional structure and personnel as needed
to achieve efficient outcomes. See James A. Gazell, Chief Justice Warren’s Neglected
Accomplishments in Federal Judicial Administration, 5 PEPP. L. REV. 437, 446-48 (1978);
James A. Gazell, Justice Tom C. Clark as Judicial Reformer, 15 HOUS. L. REV. 307, 311-12,
316 (1978). The Judicial Conference was a natural tool for achieving and legitimating these
outcomes. All three were also tireless advocates for robust use of the tools of federal judicial
administration. Judge Parker in particular espoused a philosophy of “judge dominance of the
administration of justice,” developed in response to the widespread political attacks on judges
that he observed early in his career. Peter G. Fish, Guarding the Judicial Ramparts: John J.
Parker and the Administration of Federal Justice, 3 JUST. SYS. J. 105, 106 (1977). As Fish has
described it, Parker
labored to insulate the judicial function. Subordination of lawyers and of popular
control evidenced in jury, diversity jurisdiction, and rule-making struggles
worked to further judicial autonomy and to safeguard that function.
Establishment of a distinct federal court administrative system and judgecontrolled procedural rule-making power maximized the role of judges in the
administration of federal justice.
Id.
251. See supra Part II (highlighting the three buffering structures).
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tricably tied, and the Administrative Office’s role in rulemaking
would necessarily increase. Quietly, the power of the Chief Justice
would also grow dramatically: he would have a role in every level of
the rulemaking hierarchy, as the appointer of Advisory Committee
and Standing Committee members, the head of the Judicial Conference, and the leader of the Supreme Court.252
The expansion of judicial control over rulemaking would require
external support, particularly from the bar and from Congress. To
secure this support, the federal court leadership turned to influence
tactics to manipulate those groups’ existing beliefs about the appropriate structure of court-centered rulemaking.253 They began with
the ABA, where both Parker and Clark were well connected.254 In
November 1957, the ABA’s Section of Judicial Administration held
a panel discussion on the Queen Mary Compromise proposal (now
a draft bill), during which prominent attorneys, judges and academics all advocated for Judicial Conference involvement in rulemaking.255 The panelists repeatedly emphasized two points: (1) the
Judicial Conference was well equipped to organize and manage
rulemaking, and (2) the rules committees would be so constituted
that both judges and the bar would have an important voice in rule
proposals.256 Third Circuit Chief Judge John Biggs, for example,
explained that “it was our thought ... that most of these persons [on
the Advisory Committee] would be the people in the field who deal
with the rules every day.”257
The messaging was tremendously successful. Once the ABA and
the judiciary leant their support to the proposal, Justice Clark
252. For an empirical study of this power, see generally Dawn M. Chutkow, The Chief
Justice as Executive: Judicial Conference Committee Appointments, 2 J.L. & CTS. 301 (2014).
253. Influence tactics are directed toward changing values and beliefs or definitions and
criteria of acceptable practices or performance. See Oliver, supra note 45, at 158. Such tactics
are an aggressive organizational response to environmental conditions, typically manifested
in lobbying efforts and coalition building. See id.
254. Clark had become Chair of the ABA’s Section of Judicial Administration in July 1957,
and Parker had been active in the ABA leadership since the 1930s. See Morris A. Soper, A
Tribute to Judge John J. Parker—“The Gladsome Light of Jurisprudence,” 37 N.C. L. REV. 1,
10 (1958) (statement of Fred B. Helms); The Rule-Making Function and the Judicial
Conference of the United States, 44 A.B.A. J. 42, 44 (1958).
255. See generally The Rule-Making Function and the Judicial Conference of the United
States, supra note 254.
256. See generally id.
257. Id. at 44 (statement of Chief Judge Biggs).
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began mobilizing state committees of the ABA to lobby Congress.258
Other bar organizations quickly followed suit; in all, at least seventeen different bar and professional organizations formally supported
the bill.259 The influence tactics and logrolling efforts had their
intended effect. The proposed bill passed the Senate Judiciary Committee without amendment and received a glowing report in June
1958,260 and Congress passed the bill shortly thereafter.261 The
upshot of the final legislation was that the judicial role in courtcentered rulemaking had been dramatically increased, with the
awareness and full support of perhaps the two most significant
constituencies in the federal courts’ external environment.
The Judicial Conference wasted little time establishing greater
control over rulemaking. In 1959, it formally created the Standing
Committee on the Rules of Practice and Procedure, as well as five
Advisory Committees.262 Each Advisory Committee would develop
proposed rules as needed, and submit them directly to the Standing Committee for review.263 If approved there, the rule proposals
would go to the Judicial Conference, then to the Supreme Court.264
The new structure also introduced federal judges at the Advisory
Committee level. While the original Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules did not include a single judge among its members,265 the
newly constituted Advisory Committee post-1958 included three
federal judges among its fifteen members,266 and the new Standing
Committee included four more judges among its membership.267
Moreover, within about a decade, the number of judges would far
eclipse nonjudges on the Advisory Committee.268 With additional
258. See Frank, supra note 244, at 34.
259. S. REP. NO . 85-1744, at 3025-26 (1958).
260. See id. at 3023, 3026.
261. Act of July 11, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-513, 72 Stat. 356.
262. See Maris, supra note 237, at 774.
263. Baker, supra note 244, at 329.
264. See id. at 330-31.
265. See Coleman, supra note 208, at 290 (noting that the original Advisory Committee
consisted of five academics, and the rest government and private lawyers).
266. See Maris, supra note 237, at 774 n.29.
267. See id.
268. Minutes of the Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Sept. 21, 1971,
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/CV09-1971-min.pdf [https://perma.
cc/4YZD-EVYW] (showing eleven judges and only five nonjudges on the Advisory Committee).
One recent study notes that after judges became the ascendant majority on the Advisory
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judges on the Standing Committee and a Judicial Conference composed exclusively of federal judges, any rule proposal would pass
before dozens of federal judges before it could become effective.
C. Inviting Public Input, 1975-1994
The federal court system shored up internal support for courtcentered rulemaking in the 1950s by introducing federal judges at
every level of the rulemaking process.269 The strategy had worked
in part because rulemaking’s external legitimacy was largely unaffected by the substitution of judges for academics. Whatever its
precise composition, the Advisory Committee still operated under
the direct authority of the Supreme Court, and the Committee
benefitted from the Court’s own legitimacy. By the 1970s, however,
the credentials of both the Committee and the Court were called
into question. Critics argued that only a few Advisory Committee
members were truly experts in rulemaking, and in any event, they
would be rotated off the Committee after three years.270 Other
commentators challenged the belief that the Justices of the Supreme Court had sufficient expertise to even sign off competently on
rules for the trial courts.271 Put differently, the challenge to
rulemaking in this era was not whether experts should be involved
in court-centered rulemaking, but rather whether the chosen
experts were indeed “experts” at all.
The federal court system had to adjust to this changing perception of expertise by finding an alternative source of rulemaking
legitimacy. Faced with the same problem in an adjudicative capacity, the Supreme Court had sought legitimacy through “public
confidence,” as measured by public opinion polls.272 But the legitimacy of court-centered rulemaking could not be captured by polling, in part because the results of rulemaking were barely salient to
Committee in 1971, “[a]cademics disappeared from the committee entirely for a decade and
then rebounded to something on the order of a 10 percent share of seats.” Stephen B. Burbank
& Sean Farhang, Federal Court Rulemaking and Litigation Reform: An Institutional
Approach, 15 NEV. L.J. 1559, 1568 (2015).
269. See supra notes 265-67 and accompanying text.
270. See Cheryl L. Haas, Judicial Rulemaking: Criticisms and Cures for a System in Crisis,
70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 135, 145 n.68 (1995).
271. See id. at 146 & nn.71-72 (citing criticisms).
272. See Bassok, supra note 116, at 194.
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the general public, and in part because the public had no opportunity to evaluate the rulemaking process. A different basis for legitimacy was needed, and the court system found it in a familiar place:
executive branch agencies.
Administrative rulemaking by executive branch agencies had
developed in parallel with court-centered rulemaking,273 and similarly benefitted in its early decades from the perception that
rulemaking was best left in the hands of thoughtful experts.274 But
by the early 1970s this perception had changed. There was instead
“a general social trend that came to view agencies less as apolitical
‘experts’ administering a strictly rational process, and more as
political bodies making choices among alternatives in response to
social needs and political inputs.”275 As a result, the prior consensus
on expertise—“that agency action was ‘expert,’ intended to operate
at some remove from politics”276—was called into question.
The perceived value of expertise was also changing. While an
agency in the New Deal Era “could over time acquire sufficient
expertise in a particular subject matter to second-guess private
decisionmakers on limited questions,”277 by the 1970s the scope of
agency authority had grown such that “[n]o individual ... ha[d] genuine expertise in all of the required areas.”278 Accordingly, agencies
were instructed to take more seriously both the nature and scope of
public comment and the explanation each agency provided for its
final actions.279 If an initial round of comments produced significant changes to the proposal, a second round of public comments
would also be needed.280 Moreover, each agency was advised to clearly state “the factual basis for and reasonableness of its judgments,

273. See Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified at
5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (2012)).
274. See Schiller, supra note 210, at 418.
275. Peter L. Strauss, From Expertise to Politics: The Transformation of American
Rulemaking, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 745, 755-56 (1996); see also James O. Freedman,
Expertise and the Administrative Process, 28 ADMIN . L. REV. 363, 369-74 (1976) (identifying
sources of public skepticism toward expertise).
276. See Strauss, supra note 275, at 753.
277. Thomas O. McGarity, The Internal Structure of EPA Rulemaking, 54 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 57, 60 (1991).
278. Id. at 61.
279. See Strauss, supra note 275, at 756-57.
280. See id. at 757.
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and that it had taken a ‘hard look’ at any matters that had proved
controversial” in order to withstand legal challenges.281
Congress played a significant part in creating these new norms
of openness and accountability.282 It demanded greater transparency in the administrative process through the Freedom of Information Act,283 the Government in the Sunshine Act,284 and related
legislation.285 It also passed the Federal Advisory Committee Act
(FACA), which required federal committees dispensing “advice or
recommendations”286 to the President or executive branch agencies
to make their deliberations “objective and accessible to the public”287—a mandate that was extended in short order to require fully
open meetings.288 But the federal courts played a healthy role in
opening administrative rulemaking as well, by reading the notice
and comment provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
more vigorously than before, and by instituting “hard look” review
on their own initiative.289 As Peter Strauss observed, “[o]ne finds in
the cases of this time ... an appreciation of the virtues of rulemaking
from this [open] perspective, since in rulemaking anyone was free to
participate.”290
Whether the federal courts recognized it at the time, their insistence on transparency and public participation in administrative
rulemaking would eventually create pressure to conform courtcentered rulemaking to the same values. To be sure, the two forms

Id.
Id. at 758.
Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012)).
Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552b (2012)).
See Freedman, supra note 275, at 368.
5 U.S.C. app. 2, § 3(2) (2012).
Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) Management Overview, U.S. GEN . SERVS.
ADMIN ., https://www.gsa.gov/policy-regulations/policy/federal-advisory-committee-act-facamanagement-overview [https://perma.cc/FD9K-2JLL].
288. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Negotiated Rulemaking and Administrative Law, 38 ADMIN .
L. REV. 471, 491 (1986). For an empirical study of the mixed effect of open meetings on federal
advisory committees, see generally Kevin D. Karty, Membership Balance, Open Meetings, and
Effectiveness in Federal Advisory Committees, 35 AM . REV. PUB. ADMIN. 414 (2005).
289. See Strauss, supra note 275, at 757. “Notice and comment” practice requires the
agency to publish a notice of proposed rulemaking, offer an opportunity for the public to give
written comments on the proposed rule, and provide a concise general explanation for its
reason for adopting the rule. See id. at 752.
290. Id. at 756.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
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of rulemaking differed in important ways,291 and not everyone immediately saw parallels between court-centered rulemaking and its
administrative cousin.292 But beneath historical and cosmetic differences lay increasing areas of intersection and overlap.293 Both
forms of rulemaking derived their authority from Congress and
were subject to the legislature’s watchful eye.294 A subset of attorneys was becoming well-versed in both the agency rulemaking
process and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, poised to carry administrative ideas into the adjudicative realm. And federal courts
themselves were routinely determining the propriety of agency rules
and procedures.
This increased interaction between the courts and agencies led to
a cross-pollination of ideas and values—so much so that by the
1970s, both court rulemaking and agency rulemaking bodies could
be said to occupy the same organizational field.295 That is, the two
forms of rulemaking were sufficiently connected that their participants would interact regularly and come to possess a common
meaning system.296 Administrative rulemaking and court-centered
rulemaking remained distinct endeavors on paper, but in practice
they shared many networks, practices, and norms,297 and were characterized by common beliefs, cultural frames, and archetypes.298
291. See Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic
Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficiency, 87 GEO . L.J. 887, 907-08 (1999).
292. See, e.g., Wheeler, supra note 200, at 281-82 (describing public involvement in courtcentered rulemaking as “[i]ronic[ ]”).
293. See Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen Staszewski, The Supreme Court’s Regulation of Civil
Procedure: Lessons from Administrative Law, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1188, 1205 (2012).
294. See id. at 1191.
295. In its most basic definition, an organizational field consists of “those organizations
that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life.” Paul J. DiMaggio &
Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective
Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM . SOC. REV. 147, 148 (1983).
296. See Melissa Wooten & Andrew J. Hoffman, Organizational Fields: Past, Present, and
Future, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL INSTITUTIONALISM 55, 56 (Royston
Greenwood et al. eds., 2d ed. 2017).
297. See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN . L. REV. 863, 863-64 (2006)
(noting the increase in voluntary engagement among multiple players in the regulatory field
in the second half of the twentieth century); Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 293, at 1205
(identifying analogous features between administrative agencies and the federal courts with
respect to rulemaking).
298. Organizations within a field need not be directly connected to each other or
constructed the same way, as long as they share some sense of identity and “perceive each
other as peers or ‘like units’ in some important sense.” Olga Frishman, Transnational Judicial
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Organizational fields are a source of ideas, guidance, and support
for their constituent organizations. But they also exert pressure on
those organizations to conform to the field’s shared values and
practices.299 The reward for conformity is legitimacy: by looking and
acting similar to other organizations in the same field—looking the
way an organization in that field is “supposed to look”—an organization can boost its level of social approval.300 By contrast, failure to
conform to the accepted norms of the organizational field can diminish an organization’s legitimacy, with consequences ranging from
social disapproval to full-on ostracism.301
The emergent values of public participation and transparency in
the broader organizational field threatened the legitimacy of courtcentered rulemaking’s still internal, and mostly private, process.302
The court system consequently felt pressure to conform its rulemaking procedures to the new norms of openness.303 This pressure
came in three forms. First, the court system felt coercive pressures
in the form of direct legislative challenges to court-centered rulemaking’s procedures and outcomes.304 In 1973, Congress suspended
implementation of the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence—the first
time it had ever exercised its supervisory authority under the Rules
Dialogue as an Organisational Field, 19 EUR. L.J. 739, 744 (2013) (quoting Klaus Dingwerth
& Philipp Pattberg, World Politics and Organizational Fields: The Case of Transnational
Sustainability Governance, 15 EUR. J. INT’L RELATIONSHIPS 707, 720 (2009)).
299. See Rachel Ashworth et al., Escape from the Iron Cage? Organizational Change and
Isomorphic Pressures in the Public Sector, 19 J. PUB. ADMIN . RES. & THEORY 165, 170 (2007)
(“Institutional theory suggests that organizations conform to the coercive, normative, and
mimetic pressures that surround them. Such pressures are pervasive in modern and mature
organizational fields.”); Pursey P.M.A.R. Heugens & Michel W. Lander, Structure! Agency!
(And Other Quarrels): A Meta-Analysis of Institutional Theories of Organization, 52 ACAD .
MGMT. J. 61, 62 (2009) (“Organizations sharing an organizational field and occupying a
similar structural position in it can reasonably be expected to be exposed to similar structural
forces.”).
300. See, e.g., David L. Deephouse, Does Isomorphism Legitimate?, 39 ACAD . MGMT. J. 1024,
1033 (1996) (finding empirical support for this proposition in a study of Minnesota banks).
301. See id. at 1026.
302. See Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 293, at 1202-04.
303. See Bone, supra note 291, at 903; Coleman, supra note 208, at 279.
304. Coercive pressures are based in politics and power: they are “formal and informal
pressures exerted on organizations by other organizations upon which they are dependent and
by cultural expectations in the society within which organizations function.” DiMaggio &
Powell, supra note 295, at 150; see also Eva Boxenbaum & Stefan Jonsson, Isomorphism,
Diffusion, and Decoupling, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL INSTITUTIONALISM ,
supra note 45, at 78, 80 (“[C]oercive pressures result from power relationships and politics.”).
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Enabling Act.305 Four years later, the House of Representatives
initiated a series of hearings to explore the need for greater public
participation and transparency in court-centered rulemaking.306 The
House hearings, which would be held in fits and starts over the next
decade, took a more urgent tone after the Supreme Court approved
controversial amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 in
1983 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 in 1985.307 In all,
Congress enacted two dozen laws modifying or suspending courtproposed procedural rules between 1973 and 1984.308 Even though
Congress did not mandate transparency for court-centered rulemaking in this period (as it had for administrative rulemaking), its
heightened attention to court rulemaking likely placed pressure on
the federal court system to adopt its own transparency norms.309
The court system also felt mimetic pressures to open its rulemaking process, a direct consequence of its own insistence that
administrative rulemaking take on a more public dimension.310 As
noted above, during this era, the federal courts ratcheted up the
notice-and-comment process for agency rulemaking, imposing additional participation and transparency requirements that did not
305. See Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9 (1973); Bone, supra note 291, at 902. The proposed
evidence rules were the culmination of a seven-year effort within the court-centered
rulemaking process and had the blessing of the entire judicial rulemaking hierarchy. See Paul
F. Rothstein, The Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 GEO . L.J. 125,
125 (1973). Nevertheless, Congress suspended implementation until it could study the rules
further—the first time it had ever exercised its power to do so under the Rules Enabling Act.
Id. at 126 & n.6. Congress would later propose its own amendments to the draft rules. Id. at
126.
306. See Carl Tobias, Improving the 1988 and 1990 Judicial Improvement Acts, 46 STAN .
L. REV. 1589, 1598 (1994).
307. See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 268, at 1585-86.
308. See Geyh, supra note 130, at 1188.
309. The degree of congressional attention may influence not only the structure and
transparency of court-centered rulemaking, but also the scope and nature of proposed
amendments. Stephen Burbank and Sean Farhang have suggested, for example, that
Congress’s focus on class actions in the 1990s and early 2000s “highlighted the institutional
stakes” for the Advisory Committee, “dampening the zeal for ambitious retrenchment even
of [Committee] members otherwise favoring it.” Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Rights
and Retrenchment in the Trump Era, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 37, 56 (2018). By contrast, the
federal discovery rules, which elicited far less congressional interest (and which raised fewer
flags under the Rules Enabling Act), received a much more comprehensive overhaul in 2015.
See id. at 54-56.
310. Mimetic pressures are felt inside the organization and reflect its members’ desire to
look like other “legitimate” organizations in the same field. See Ashworth et al., supra note
299, at 167.
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appear in the text of the APA.311 Even though these decisions were
limited to agency rulemaking, they suggested a growing judicial
consensus favoring public participation and transparency. Indeed,
even one of the most forceful critics of enhanced judicial review of
administrative rulemaking, Judge J. Skelly Wright of the D.C.
Circuit, acknowledged that basic fairness required a certain level of
public involvement.312 That Judge Wright and Chief Justice Warren
Burger—both highly experienced in administrative adjudication
and both supporters of public input into administrative rulemaking—sat as members of the Judicial Conference from 1978 to
1980 must have heavily influenced the Judicial Conference’s
thinking on this issue.313
Finally, the court system felt normative pressures from others in
the legal profession to open court-centered rulemaking to participation and public view.314 In the aftermath of the Evidence Rules
fiasco, some academics argued that the Supreme Court had become
a rubber stamp for the Advisory Committee, signing off on rules
changes that were developed under secretive and opaque conditions
which had not been properly scrutinized.315 Professor Howard
Lesnick summarized the charges:
[W]e face the unique situation of rules drafted by a committee of
private citizens and judges acting in an advisory capacity, which
operates for the most part in private; approved by a body of
311. See Strauss, supra note 275, at 756. Notably, a series of court decisions in the early
1970s afforded the public both a qualified right of cross-examination and a right to access
details of an agency’s methodology. Stephen F. Williams, “Hybrid Rulemaking” Under the
Administrative Procedure Act: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 401, 402
(1975). Neither of these rights appeared in the “notice-and-comment” provisions of the APA,
suggesting to commentators that the federal courts themselves created a new procedural
category of “hybrid” or “notice-and-comment-plus” rulemaking. Id.
312. See J. Skelly Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judicial
Review, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 375, 397 (1974).
313. Judicial Conference of the United States: Members, FED . JUD . CTR., https://
www.fjc.gov/history/administration/judicial-conference-united-states-members
[https://perma.cc/J9UY-A3PN].
314. Normative pressures are tied to notions of professionalism and “pertain to what is
widely considered a proper course of action, or even a moral duty, such as when there are
signals from the organizational environment that the adoption of a particular practice or
structure is a correct moral choice.” Boxenbaum & Jonsson, supra note 304, at 80 (internal
citation omitted).
315. Baker, supra note 244, at 327; Coleman, supra note 208, at 276.
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judges, meeting entirely in private; promulgated by the Supreme
Court without any real expectation, or the procedure to warrant
that expectation, of focused consideration of constitutional or
statutory questions; and “approved” by the legislature through
simple inaction for a period of ninety days. In short, neither as
a legislative nor an adjudicatory process does the present
structure for rule making meet the expectations of our constitutional traditions.316

Lesnick was not alone: the unmistakable tenor from most academic
commentaries of the time was that the existing rulemaking process
provided insufficient guarantees of legitimate outcomes.317 Proposed
solutions to the problem varied,318 but the bulk of them reflected
scholars’ increasingly positive view of notice-and-comment rulemaking, which was seen as more democratic and more accountable
than the work of cloistered experts.319 If the structure of administrative rulemaking carried such significant benefits for a democratic society, surely, they argued, a similar structure should
improve the court-centered rulemaking product.320
A separate source of normative pressures on the federal court
system came from the practicing bar. As attorneys became increasingly familiar with the notice-and-comment process on the agency
316. Howard Lesnick, The Federal Rule-Making Process: A Time for Re-Examination, 61
A.B.A. J. 579, 582 (1975).
317. But see Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Undemocratic Legislation, 87 YALE L.J. 1284, 1294
(1978) (book review) (“[A] quite undemocratic legislative [rulemaking] process has proven
capable of producing a very satisfactory product.”).
318. Among the suggestions were calls to increase public input into the rulemaking
process, see Jack B. Weinstein, Reform of Federal Court Rulemaking Procedures, 76 COLUM .
L. REV. 905, 931-33 (1976); requiring that rules be promulgated directly by the Judicial
Conference rather than the Supreme Court, see MICHAL R. BELKNAP, THE SUPREME COURT
UNDER EARL WARREN , 1953-1969, at 262 (2005); and returning to direct Supreme Court
oversight of the Advisory Committees, see Jack H. Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of the
Supreme Court: A Contemporary Crisis, 27 STAN . L. REV. 673, 677 (1975). Professor Lesnick
himself advocated for a “more representative” composition of the advisory committees and
tentatively suggested replacing the Judicial Conference in the rulemaking hierarchy with a
legislative commission. See Lesnick, supra note 316, at 581-83.
319. See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms, Decisionmaking,
and Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE L.J. 377, 406-07 (2006); Strauss,
supra note 275, at 755.
320. See Nina A. Mendelson, Rulemaking, Democracy, and Torrents of E-Mail, 79 GEO .
WASH . L. REV. 1343, 1349 (2011) (discussing normative pressures toward accountability in an
institutional field).
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side, it was only a matter of time before they would bring some of
the same expectations to court-centered rulemaking. Government
lawyers working within regulatory agencies, for example, “typically
preside[ ] at any informal public hearings that the agency conducts
in connection with rulemaking initiatives.”321 As attorneys moved
in and out of agency employment, or even socialized with other attorneys about the nature of their jobs, the expectation of public
involvement in court-centered rulemaking was bound to spread
across the profession.322
Court-centered rulemaking might have been less susceptible to
these environmental pressures if there were a tangible means of
demonstrating its utility to the public. Rulemaking, however, lacks
interpretable output measures.323 There is no consensus, for example, on the optimal number of rules amendments that the
Advisory Committee should propose or the number of constituencies it should consult each year. Consequently, the court system had
to take more visible measures to bolster confidence in rulemaking
among Congress, the bar, and the public.324 And adopting the
emerging norms of its organizational field—the norms of transparency and public participation—were its best bet to maintain
legitimacy with those constituencies.325 That meant opening courtcentered rulemaking to the public, and ceding internal control, more
than ever before.
As in previous eras, however, the federal court system softened
the blow of diminished internal control by adding a new buffering
dimension to the rulemaking process. In this instance, the new
dimension was education, and the tool of choice was the FJC. That
body’s research on rulemaking would provide the court system with
321. Thomas O. McGarity, The Role of Government Attorneys in Regulatory Agency
Rulemaking, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 19, 24 (1998).
322. While they expressed different values, the mimetic and normative pressures on the
court system overlapped in practice. Those advocates of greater transparency inside the court
system may well have felt that opening the rulemaking process was both the right thing to
do (a normative pressure) and the safe thing to do (a mimetic pressure). See supra notes 310,
314.
323. See Peter Frumkin & Joseph Galaskiewicz, Institutional Isomorphism and Public
Sector Organizations, 14 J. PUB. ADMIN . RES. & THEORY 283, 289 (2004).
324. Cf. id. at 289-90.
325. See Oliver, supra note 45, at 160 tbl.4 (noting that the more an organization expects
to gain legitimacy by adopting the norms of its organizational field, the more likely it is to
adopt those norms).
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a trusted source of information, a neutral point of comparison
against public comment and the increasing number of independent
studies of the civil justice system.326 By the late 1970s, the FJC had
begun in earnest to study and publish reports on the operation of
individual court rules.327 If the public was to have its say on rules,
the court system would contribute its own research as well.
The FJC also provided a useful mechanism for channeling public
concerns about court-centered rulemaking away from the
rulemakers themselves. In his 1979 Annual Report on the State of
the Judiciary, Chief Justice Burger requested that the FJC and the
Judicial Conference take a fresh look at the court-centered rulemaking process.328 In response, the FJC organized a conference on
federal rulemaking in December of that year, at which critiques
and proposals were discussed and debated.329 The discussion—later
documented in a 1981 FJC report by Winifred Brown—captured
many of the critiques of court-centered rulemaking that had been
circulating for a decade.330 In doing so, it made tangible the pressures felt by the court system to conform to agency rulemaking
norms and enabled the court system to be seen as adopting those
norms on its own initiative.
Not that the court system was waiting for the FJC in order to
change its practices. As early as 1978, the Advisory Committee
began holding formal public hearings on its proposed amendments
to the discovery rules.331 By 1983, the Standing Committee had
announced an “evolved practice” which included public hearings
and the publication of transcripts.332 When Congress finally did
amend the Rules Enabling Act in 1988 by passing the Judicial

326. See Gazell, supra note 250, at 457-58.
327. See generally, e.g., PAUL R. CONNOLLY ET AL., JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE CIVIL
LITIGATIVE PROCESS: DISCOVERY (1978); PAUL R. J. CONNOLLY & PATRICIA A. LOMBARD ,
JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE CIVIL LITIGATIVE PROCESS: MOTIONS (1980); JOSEPH L. EBERSOLE
& BARLOW BURKE, DISCOVERY PROBLEMS IN CIVIL CASES (1980); NANCY WEEKS, DISTRICT
COURT IMPLEMENTATION OF AMENDED CIVIL RULE 16: A REPORT ON NEW LOCAL RULES (1984).
328. Warren E. Burger, The State of the Federal Judiciary—1979, 65 A.B.A. J. 358, 360
(1979).
329. WINIFRED R. BROWN , FEDERAL RULEMAKING : PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES, at vi-ix
(1981).
330. See generally id. at 41-86.
331. See Marcus, supra note 209, at 917.
332. Freer, supra note 194, at 460.
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Improvements and Access to Justice Act (JIA),333 most of the
legislation’s key elements—including opening meetings to the public
(with good cause exceptions), adding appellate judges to the
Advisory Committee, and publishing a statement of the Committee’s procedures—had already been implemented by the court
system years earlier.334
The JIA has been criticized as an instance of congressional
capture by special interests: groups that had previously been shut
out of rulemaking successfully lobbied Congress to open up the
process, thereby enabling them to similarly lobby the Advisory
Committee (or any other group in the rulemaking hierarchy) for
advantageous rules.335 But to ascribe the opening of the rulemaking
process only to the work of special interests is to miss the federal
courts’ own interest in opening the process. And the way in which
openness in rulemaking was eventually manifested—by largely
mimicking the notice-and-comment process for executive agency
rulemaking336—was no accident. It was a predictable result of
forces that emerged inside and outside the federal court system
during the previous two decades.337 Over time, the federal court
system “consciously and strategically cho[se] to comply with institutional pressures in anticipation of specific self-serving benefits.”338
D. Efficiency Through Decoupling, 1995-2015
The opening of court-centered rulemaking to public involvement
in the 1970s and 1980s was necessary to maintain the federal court

333. Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642 (1988) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2073 (2012)).
334. See Kravitz et al., supra note 191, at 507-08.
335. See, e.g., Geyh, supra note 130, at 1188-89, 1189 n.122; Linda S. Mullenix, Judicial
Power and the Rules Enabling Act, 46 MERCER L. REV. 733, 736 (1995); Linda S. Mullenix,
Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C.
L. REV. 795, 835 n.206, 836-37 (1991).
336. See Freer, supra note 194, at 460 (noting that the 1988 amendments to the Rules
Enabling Act look “a good deal like agency rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure
Act. [The JIA] changed the rulemaking process fundamentally from one in the hands of a
cadre of experts to a participatory model.” (footnotes omitted)).
337. See supra notes 304-22 and accompanying text (discussing the three forms of pressure
that the federal court system faced).
338. See Oliver, supra note 45, at 153 (describing the “[c]ompliance” tactic within the larger
organizational response of acquiescence).
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system’s legitimacy in the rulemaking arena.339 But maintaining
legitimacy came with costs. During the 1990s, court rulemakers
were increasingly challenged by the volume and intensity of competing proposals, leading to high-profile delays.340 Even ordinary
rule changes typically took three years or more, virtually assuring
widespread turnover in the membership of the Advisory Committee
from the time a rule proposal was initiated to the time the final rule
was promulgated.341 Sending a proposal up the hierarchy to the
Standing Committee, Judicial Conference, and Supreme Court further extended the process.342 As one commentator blithely noted in
1998, current practice “requires more steps to amend a Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure than it does to amend the U.S. Constitution.”343
Commentators took notice, drawing parallels between the trends
affecting court-centered rulemaking and those affecting its institutional cousin.344 Agency rulemaking suffered a crisis of ossification in the 1980s, as federal agencies reacted to demands for a
more substantial paper trail.345 In some instances, efforts to comply
with anticipated “hard look” review346 dragged out a single agency
339. See supra note 33.
340. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 89, at 595-96 (noting that the 2010 amendments to Rule
56 had their genesis in a 1992 proposal, and that the core proposal “published for comment
in the summer of 2008 was shaped by three years of continuous work”); David Marcus,
Institutions and an Interpretive Methodology for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 2011
UTAH L. REV. 927, 954-55 (discussing the ten-year saga over proposed amendments to Federal
Rule 23).
341. See Cooper, supra note 89, at 593.
342. See Stephen C. Yeazell, Judging Rules, Ruling Judges, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
229, 235 (1998).
343. Id. (footnote omitted)
344. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Implementing Procedural Change: Who, How, Why, and
When?, 49 ALA. L. REV. 221, 244-45 (1997); Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 293, at 120304.
345. See Strauss, supra note 275, at 760. Commentators have recognized that all three
branches of the federal government contributed to the problem through additional demands
on the rulemaking process, but the broad consensus placed “most of the blame for ossification
on judicially created administrative law doctrines.” Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment
Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483, 485 (1997).
346. The hard look doctrine
helps to ensure that agency decisions are determined neither by accommodation
of purely private interests nor by surreptitious commandeering of the
decisionmaking apparatus to serve an agency’s idiosyncratic view of the public
interest.... Essentially, under the hard look test, the reviewing court scrutinizes
the agency’s reasoning to make certain that the agency carefully deliberated
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rulemaking for a decade or more.347 In other instances, agencies
simply gave up on rulemaking, concluding that the time and money
spent to devise a rule under judicially augmented APA procedures
did not justify the risk that a court would later set the rule aside.348
Even when an agency did successfully promulgate a rule, the cost
and complexity of rulemaking gave it “every incentive” not to reexamine it, even in the face of new data.349
Court-centered rulemaking never experienced this degree of
stasis, but the risks were ever-present. Among other things, the
advent of “e-rulemaking”—the use of Internet-based technology to
expand public access to the rulemaking process350—at the turn of
the century expanded the possibility that rulemakers would be
swamped with outside comments.351 Easier access to the rulemaking
process can amplify the number of comments from the public in
high-visibility rulemakings, sometimes by orders of magnitude.352
An early draft of the 2013 proposed amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, for example, drew more than 2300
comments.353

about the issues raised by its decision.
Seidenfeld, supra note 345, at 491 (footnotes omitted).
347. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN . L.
REV. 59, 61 (1995) (discussing a single EPA rulemaking costing millions of dollars and taking
ten years, which was eventually set aside as being procedurally inadequate).
348. See id. (describing The Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s failure to
issue rules related to toxic substances).
349. See Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process,
41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1390 (1992).
350. See Mendelson, supra note 320, at 1344.
351. In the early 2000s, the federal government began designing a single web portal and
common electronic docket for its rulemaking entities. See generally The eRulemaking Initiative, REGULATIONS.GOV, https://regulations.gov/aboutProgram [https://perma.cc/5EZUAEN6]. That portal, launched in 2003, covers more than 300 federal entities, including the
federal court system. About Us: Partner Agencies, REGULATIONS.GOV, https://www.regulations.
gov/aboutPartners [https://perma.cc/HEQ3-8LWR]. The Obama Administration urged
rulemaking agencies to embrace the next generation of technology by bringing social media
into the rulemaking process. See Mendelson, supra note 320, at 1345; Elizabeth Porter &
Kathryn Watts, Visual Regulation—and Visual Deregulation, YALE J. ON REG .: NOTICE &
COMMENT (Jan. 29, 2018), http://yalejreg.com/nc/visual-regulation-and-visual-deregulation-byelizabeth-porter-kathryn-watts/ [https://perma.cc/7NMN-89ZU].
352. See Mendelson, supra note 320, at 1345.
353. See Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Docket ID
USC-RULES-CV-2013-0002, REGULATIONS.GOV, https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D= USCRULES-CV-2013-0002 [https://perma.cc/XE7K-ZULZ].
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A large number of comments, however, does not necessarily reflect a broad or accurate range of interests. Federal agencies have
recently endured spates of regulatory comments “submitted” by
individuals who are dead, never existed, or are unaware that their
names have been used.354 Even when the comments themselves are
genuine, they are often identically worded and their submission
carefully orchestrated.355 Professors Burbank and Farhang, for
example, concluded that the thousands of comments on the proposed
amendments in 2013 primarily reflected “powerful interest group
mobilization.”356 At bottom, focusing merely on the volume or intensity of public comment “runs the risk of equating topics that
evoke substantial reaction with substantive.”357
Increased public comment—whether from e-rulemaking or otherwise—imposes additional externalities on rulemaking’s deliberative
process. One is the sheer volume of work for rulemakers: while not
all proposed rules amendments will draw the kind of explosive
public response seen in 2013,358 the Advisory Committee faces both
a legal and a sociological obligation to comb through the comments
and give each an appropriate level of consideration.359 Another is
timing: the ease and speed of communicating through the Internet places additional pressure on rulemakers to show early responsiveness to public concerns.360 Finally, as public input grows
through e-rulemaking, rulemakers have to sort through more
354. See James V. Grimaldi & Paul Overberg, Fake Comments Hit Rule Making, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 13, 2017, at A1; James V. Grimaldi & Paul Overberg, Fiduciary Rule Draws A Lot of
Fake Critics, WALL ST. J., Dec. 28, 2017, at B1.
355. See Mendelson, supra note 320, at 1359, 1361 (noting that many agencies receive
comments from individuals with identical or near-identical text, which were drafted and
supplied by an interest group).
356. Burbank & Farhang, supra note 268, at 1595.
357. Freer, supra note 194, at 461 (emphasis omitted).
358. See Richard Marcus, How to Steer an Ocean Liner, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 615, 616
(2014) (“For the last 20 years or so, even controversial rule-amendment packages have
attracted no more than about 300 comments during the statutorily directed public comment
period.”); see also, e.g., Burbank & Farhang, supra note 309, at 57-58 (noting that proposed
amendments to Rule 23 in 2017 “elicited fewer than ninety written comments”).
359. See Proposed Amendments Published for Public Comment, U.S. CTS., https://www.
us court s .go v/rul e s - po l i ci e s /proposed-amendments-published-public- co mm e nt
[https://perma.cc/KG2J-TYLV] (“Written comments are welcome on each rule proposal. The
advisory committees will review all timely comments, which are made part of the official
record and are available to the public.”).
360. See Mendelson, supra note 320, at 1345-46.
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comments and take stock not only of technical points but also of
increasing numbers of value-laden comments.361
The federal court system was hardly the first organization to
confront the inefficiencies associated with implementing legitimacyboosting structures. As noted, administrative agencies faced a similar problem,362 as did industries as wide-ranging as hospitals,
universities, and public transit.363 Affected organizations, however,
typically do not resign themselves to inefficiency as the inevitable
price of maintaining legitimacy. Rather, they decouple their realworld practices from their formal or espoused structure, retaining
the ceremonial trappings of formal practices but only superficially
abiding by them.364 The decoupling process “enables organizations
to maintain standardized, legitimating, formal structures while
their activities vary in response to practical considerations.”365
Professor Oliver describes decoupling as a concealment tactic, which
involves “disguising nonconformity behind a facade of acquiescence.”366
The federal court system adopted an unmistakable decoupling
strategy in the 1990s and early 2000s to streamline the rulemaking
process. One important tactic was to reach out informally to select
parties before announcing any proposed rule change, thereby affording those parties an opportunity to shape the rule before it went
public. In the mid-1980s, Paul Carrington, as Reporter to the
Advisory Committee, broke with longstanding tradition and began
circulating amendment proposals to scholars, practitioners, and
“interested bar groups to get their reactions and ideas on pending
issues.”367 This process was continued by Carrington’s successors,368
and became more routinized as the Advisory Committee leadership
grew to favor the practice.369 By the late 1990s, this outreach had
361. See id. at 1346.
362. See supra notes 344-49 and accompanying text.
363. See John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure
as Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM . J. SOC. 340, 355 (1977).
364. See Boxenbaum & Jonsson, supra note 304, at 80-81; Greenwood et al., supra note 45,
at 3-4; Meyer & Rowan, supra note 363, at 356-57.
365. Meyer & Rowan, supra note 363, at 357.
366. Oliver, supra note 45, at 154.
367. Paul D. Carrington, The New Order in Judicial Rulemaking, 75 JUDICATURE 161, 164
(1991).
368. Marcus, supra note 209, at 917 n.100.
369. Much of the credit for institutionalized committee outreach has been assigned to
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coalesced into a series of invitation-only meetings known as miniconferences, at which members of the Advisory Committee would
meet with representatives of various bar, academic, and industry
groups to flesh out ideas and proposals for civil rules amendments.370 Sometimes, this outreach occurred before the Advisory
Committee even prepared a rule revision.371 In other instances,
“groups were assembled to address specific issues already identified
by the Committee as seeming to warrant close attention,”372 and the
participants “focused on [existing] mock-ups of possible rule
changes.”373
A newer, but related, innovation has been to invite selected
industry groups and bar associations to attend semiannual Advisory
Committee meetings, where they may present comments directly to
the committee.374 Newer still is to assemble a large conference to
discuss issues that more broadly affect federal civil litigation. To
date, the Advisory Committee has held two such conferences: one at
Boston College Law School in 1998 (focusing on discovery practice),
and one at Duke Law School in 2010 (examining all aspects of civil
litigation from pleadings to trial).375 While not open to the public,
these “maxi-conferences” brought together scores of participants
from the judiciary, academia, government, private practice, business, and the nonprofit world.376 Studies and proposals made at
these conferences directly influenced civil rule changes in 2006 and
2015.377
In hindsight, the court system’s use of a “select participation”
decoupling strategy is not particularly surprising. Early outreach to
interested and knowledgeable parties increases the Advisory Committee’s access to a range of perspectives and information378 and
Judge Patrick Higginbotham, who Chaired the Advisory Committee from 1993 to 1996. See
Kravitz et al., supra note 191, at 519-20; Rabiej, supra note 53, at 327 n.18, 349.
370. See Cooper, supra note 89, at 595 n.11; Marcus, supra note 209, at 918 & n.102, 919
& nn.103-04.
371. See Mark R. Kravitz, To Revise, or Not to Revise: That Is the Question, 87 DENV. U. L.
REV. 213, 217 (2010).
372. Marcus, supra note 358, at 623.
373. Id.
374. See Kravitz et al., supra note 191, at 509-10.
375. See id. at 511.
376. See id.
377. See Marcus, supra note 358, at 624.
378. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 209, at 918-19 (using the example of e-discovery).
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heightens the possibility of achieving a broad consensus for a rule
change—an issue of particular importance to the Committee.379
Moreover, this very sort of outreach was partially—and ironically—blessed by Congress when it passed the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990.380 What is surprising is how successfully the
court system has framed decoupling practice as going above and
beyond congressional expectations for rulemaking transparency.381
The torrent of praise for early outreach is certainly justified in
terms of the quality of, and professional investment in, the resulting
rules. But it also masks the reality that meeting with select groups
to fashion a consensus for a draft rule before public release necessarily narrows the range of possible outcomes.382
Another decoupling strategy is captured by the typically less
intensive review of rule proposals at the top levels of the court
hierarchy. The Rules Enabling Act requires that once a proposed
rule has made it through the public participation stage with any
appropriate revisions, it must be approved by the Standing Committee, Judicial Conference, and Supreme Court before it is promulgated.383 To be sure, each level of the hierarchy formally complies
with the requirement each time. But in the thirty years since the
JIA established the modern rulemaking scheme, it has been an
extremely rare event for the Judicial Conference or the Supreme
Court to reject a proposed Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.384 The
point here is not that the Judicial Conference and Supreme Court
are deliberately shirking their responsibilities, but rather that the
379. See Rabiej, supra note 53, at 367.
380. 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570 (2012). That Act encouraged federal agencies “to form balanced
private-public negotiating groups, representative of all interests likely to be involved, that
could, with a facilitator’s aid, develop consensual proposals for rulemaking.” Strauss, supra
note 275, at 764. That is, a select group of representative interests would be tasked with
developing an agreed-upon rule before public notice of the rulemaking. See id.
381. Marcus, supra note 358, at 623.
382. See id.
383. See Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1103-04 (2002).
384. For a rare example of a rule proposal that was rejected by the Judicial Conference, see
Thomas E. Willging, Past and Potential Uses of Empirical Research in Civil Rulemaking, 77
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1121, 1156-57 (2002) (discussing a proposed change to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(c)); see also STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG , RIGHTS AND
RETRENCHMENT: THE COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION 92 (2017)
(identifying two additional proposals that did not survive Judicial Conference or Standing
Committee scrutiny).
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rulemaking hierarchy is—by design—far more rigorous on paper
than it is in practice.385 The Supreme Court and Judicial Conference’s formal compliance with their respective roles promotes rulemaking legitimacy, just as their relatively cursory review of
proposed rules promotes efficiency.386 Sensible decoupling keeps the
process in balance.387
As in previous eras, the court system’s responses in this period
have highlighted another buffering benefit of court-centered
rulemaking. The practice of decoupling effectively allows the court
system to allocate its energies toward the most promising rule
changes, while delaying or ignoring others.388 Every proposal and
comment is still read and considered, of course, but the increase in
public comments makes it impossible to consider each comment or
proposal extensively.389 Public comment, in other words, has grown
so voluminous as to give the rulemakers a certain degree of cover
from pursuing every suggestion. The result is a modern rulemaking
process whose energies are focused far more narrowly in practice
than a formal description would suggest.390
IV. THE FUTURE OF THE BUFFER
For nearly eighty-five years, the federal court system has
periodically adjusted its rulemaking buffer to maintain the buffer’s

385. See Haas, supra note 270, at 146 (discussing the Court’s “[c]ursory [r]eview” of rule
proposals); Paul J. Stancil, Close Enough for Government Work: The Committee Rulemaking
Game, 96 VA. L. REV. 69, 98 (2010) (“[T]he intermediate players, while important, are not
central .... Committee rulemaking is in some ways a two-player game between the advisory
committees and Congress.”); Laurens Walker, A Comprehensive Reform for Federal Civil
Rulemaking, 61 GEO . WASH . L. REV. 455, 463 (1993) (“[C]ivil rulemaking ... in practice gives
near absolute discretion to the Advisory Committee.”).
386. See Haas, supra note 270, at 146-47.
387. Similar decoupling strategies have been employed by administrative agencies. See,
e.g., Joel E. Hoffman, Public Participation and Binding Effect in the Promulgation of
Nonlegislative Rules: Current Developments at FDA, ADMIN . & REG . L. NEWS, Spring 1997, at
1; McGarity, supra note 349, at 1386.
388. See supra notes 89-91.
389. See Haas, supra note 270, at 146-48.
390. Cf. McGarity, supra note 349, at 1462 (“To the extent that society needs the services
that the agencies are attempting to provide, the agencies should be free to provide those
services through an efficient and effective informal rulemaking process unburdened by undue
fears of judicial or political reversal.”).
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legitimacy with its critical constituencies.391 These periodic adjustments have required some sacrifice of internal control over the
rulemaking process, but the court system has been careful never to
put the buffer itself at risk. In the coming years, a new challenge to
the legitimacy of court-centered rulemaking—the belief that rulemakers themselves are inescapably biased—will test the buffer once
again. This Part briefly describes the dimensions of this new challenge, and considers how the federal court system will respond.
A. Skepticism over Rulemaker Neutrality
Previous challenges to the legitimacy of court-centered rulemaking have focused primarily on the amount and quality of information available to rulemaking bodies.392 To be sure, there has
always been a strain of philosophical objections to the general idea
of “administrative expertise,”393 but most observers have never
seriously questioned the credentials and motivations of Advisory
Committee members. However, that is beginning to change. Over
the past decade, both the general public and the professional elite
have increasingly expressed doubts about the ability of rulemakers
to undertake their craft neutrally and without bias.
This skepticism has a broad social underpinning in the general
public’s current characterization of experts as elitist and aloof.394
A particular disdain is shown for those experts working in the
government.395 For example, in a 2015 survey by the Public Religion Research Institute, 66 percent of respondents agreed that
“everyday Americans understand what the government should do
better than the so-called ‘experts.’”396 In the same study, about onethird of respondents expressed high levels of distrust in major institutions such as the federal government, news organizations, and

391. See supra tbl.1.
392. See supra notes 197-99 and accompanying text.
393. See Yair Sagy, A Triptych of Regulators: A New Perspective on the Administrative
State, 44 AKRON L. REV. 425, 457 & n.184 (2011).
394. See TOM NICHOLS, THE DEATH OF EXPERTISE: THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST ESTABLISHED
KNOWLEDGE AND WHY IT MATTERS 218-19 (2017).
395. See ROBERT P. JONES ET AL., ANXIETY, NOSTALGIA, AND MISTRUST: FINDINGS FROM THE
2015 AMERICAN VALUES SURVEY 4, 33 (2015).
396. Id.
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large corporations.397 To distrust experts is to see them as out of
touch with ordinary citizens; as Tom Nichols has observed, “citizens
do not understand, or do not choose to understand, the difference
between experts and elected policymakers. For many Americans, all
elites are now just an undifferentiated mass of educated, rich, and
powerful people.”398 It is probably too much to say that expertise is
an affirmative liability for policymakers, but it certainly does not
warrant the deference or respect that it did a generation or two
ago.399
More pointedly, in recent years, expert bodies have been accused
of subsuming their expertise to partisan ends or even opening themselves to self-dealing.400 The recent public battle over the composition of the five-member Federal Communications Commission is one
well-known example.401 Although no similar charges have yet been
leveled at court-centered rulemaking bodies,402 the belief that other
expert bodies in the rulemaking field are merely vehicles for
partisan gain is likely to have an eventual detrimental effect on the
courts as well.
The most direct attacks on the neutrality of court-centered
rulemaking have been clothed in the language of cognitive bias.
Professor Elizabeth Thornburg, for example, has recently argued
that “[n]o matter how knowledgeable and experienced Committee
members may be, individually and collectively they lack the ability
to arrive at first principles that do not favor one type of litigant over
another.”403 Thornburg accordingly rejects the characterization of
397. See id. at 34; see also Russell J. Dalton, The Social Transformation of Trust in
Government, 15 INT’L REV. SOC. 133, 134-35 (2005) (noting a steady and steep drop in trust
in government institutions by the American public from the 1950s through the early 2000s).
398. NICHOLS, supra note 394, at 218-19.
399. See supra notes 210-15 and accompanying text (discussing the support for expertise
in the New Deal Era).
400. See Pierre Schlag, Nudge, Choice Architecture, and Libertarian Paternalism, 108
MICH . L. REV. 913, 918 n.9 (2010) (book review).
401. See, e.g., Jim Puzzanghera, Trump Nominates Brendan Carr to Fill Final FCC Seat
and Provide Crucial Vote on Net Neutrality Rules, L.A. TIMES (June 29, 2017), https://
www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-fcc-brendan-carr-20170628-story.html [https://perma.cc/F9SYKFS6].
402. But see Burbank & Farhang, supra note 309, at 48 (describing a study showing that
under Chief Justice Burger and his successors, “the Advisory Committee came to be
dominated by federal judges appointed by Republican presidents and, among its practitioner
members, by corporate lawyers”).
403. Elizabeth Thornburg, Cognitive Bias, the “Band of Experts,” and the Anti-Litigation
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the Advisory Committee as a “Band of Experts,” concluding that
“the concept does not fit the role. Although members are intelligent
and experienced, the committees fall prey to predictable cognitive
traps.”404 Other commentators have accused the Advisory Committee of confirmation bias, arguing that recent rules amendments
reflect the personal beliefs of committee members rather than
objective analyses of empirical data.405 These critiques have been
extended to the recent Duke-style “maxi-conferences,” which— notwithstanding their broad-based approach—have been characterized
as too elite406 or too dismissive of information actually presented.407
Neutrality skeptics’ proposed remedies tend to focus on altering
the membership of the offending expert body.408 One prescription is
to change a committee’s composition (either by adding new members
or replacing existing ones) to explicitly include additional perspectives, ideologies, or group identities.409 Under this view, diversifying
the racial, gender, ideological, or experiential makeup of a rules
committee would help reduce the risk of unconscious bias or
groupthink among the committee at large. A more radical reform
suggestion calls for an entirely new system of appointing committee
members, by diluting or removing altogether the Chief Justice’s
exclusive appointment authority.410 While neither proposal has yet
coalesced into a serious threat to the current rulemaking framework, it is not a stretch to imagine one or both demands gaining
steam in the near future.

Narrative, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 755, 756 (2016).
404. Id. at 792.
405. See Brooke D. Coleman, One Percent Procedure, 91 WASH . L. REV. 1005, 1052-55
(2016); Danya Shocair Reda, The Cost-and-Delay Narrative in Civil Justice Reform: Its
Fallacies and Functions, 90 OR. L. REV. 1085, 1119-20 (2012).
406. See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 405, at 1023.
407. See id. at 1054; Reda, supra note 405, at 1107-08.
408. Prescriptions tend to focus on the rulemaking body as a whole, rather than on any
individual member. See Geyh, supra note 130, at 1211-14 (citing examples).
409. See id. at 1211 n.241.
410. Such a position would not be entirely new. Variants were proposed by Judge
Weinstein, Professor Lesnick, and Dean Cramton nearly forty years ago. See BROWN , supra
note 329, at 68-69, 78-79; see also Stancil, supra note 385, at 125-27 (exploring the dynamics
of Congress appointing members of the Advisory Committee).
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B. Predicting the Federal Court System’s Response
Assuming they continue, the trends described above will force the
federal court system to further reassess the balance between courtcentered rulemaking’s internal control and external legitimacy in
the coming years. To a significant degree, the court system will be
able to meet these challenges with acquiescence strategies.411 Calls
to diversify the membership of the Advisory Committee, for example, can be met without upsetting the larger rulemaking structure.
There is no shortage of highly qualified people in every meaningful
demographic who can serve with distinction on the committee.
By contrast, proposals to revoke the court system’s internal authority over committee appointment would be met with considerable
resistance. Perhaps the court system would concede to a transfer of
power away from the Chief Justice to another internal body (say,
the Judicial Conference), but it is unlikely to permit any more
significant change. The reason is straightforward: allowing those
outside the court system to have a hand in selecting committee
members would deeply undermine the court’s internal control over
rulemaking, and with it, rulemaking’s efficacy as a buffer.412 In the
face of such a proposal, one would expect the court system to
respond with aggressive tactics: using boundary spanning allies to
influence beliefs about the court system’s structural independence,
directly attacking the details of any populist proposal, or even
pitting external groups against each other.413 Such tactics may be
costly to the court system but will be seen as justified in light of the
threat to internal control.
Might the courts adopt a different approach? Alternative responses have been suggested in the literature, but none fully accounts for the federal court system’s need to balance internal control
and external legitimacy within the rulemaking enterprise. Lori
Johnson’s suggestion that committee members drop the pretense of
expertise and attempt to become more savvy political advocates,414
for example, directly threatens the perception of neutrality that is

411.
412.
413.
414.

See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
See Johnson, supra note 52, at 36.
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the foundation of the court system’s organizational legitimacy.415
Similarly, Charles Geyh’s proposal for an Interbranch Commission
on Law Reform and the Judiciary smartly recognizes the need to
maintain the court system’s organizational legitimacy, but the proposal overcompensates by sacrificing too much internal control over
the rulemaking process.416 In the end, the court system will likely
adjust the structure of rulemaking only as much as needed to retain
its legitimacy; if proposed changes come at too great an expense of
internal control, the entire rulemaking buffer will be put at risk.
CONCLUSION
The organizational perspective inverts the traditional view of the
federal court system and its work. Administrative and rulemaking
activity, tucked safely behind adjudication in the traditional view as
a second-order function of the courts, emerge in the organizational
view as much more forceful mechanisms for assuring the court
system’s well-being. Adjudication still lies at the technical core of
the courts’ operations, but its competence, efficiency, and independence depend on the success of the organization’s non-adjudicative
tasks.
This perspective offers much-needed context to contemporary
studies of court-centered rulemaking. It clarifies the importance of
rulemaking to the federal court system’s identity and broader
agenda. It also provides a foundation for future explorations into
rulemaking’s cognitive dynamics. Questions regarding group decisionmaking, cognitive bias, use of empirical data, public participation, judicial review, and other aspects of rulemaking are improved
by explicitly accounting for the rich organizational context in which
rulemakers operate. Finally, the organizational view reminds us
that the federal court system, like any public organization, responds
to identifiable external pressures in predictable ways. Recognizing
those pressures can promote a more complete assessment of courtcentered rulemaking’s past and a more realistic discussion of its
future.

415. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
416. See Geyh, supra note 130, at 1234.

